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The acquisition of conservation easements by nonprofit
organizations (NPOs) over the past twenty-five years has
revolutionized the preservation of American land. Recently,
however, legislatures, courts, practitioners, and commentators
have debated whether and how conservation easements should be
modified and even terminated The discussion has almost always
been on a theoretical level without empirical grounding and has
sometimes generatedmuch heat but little light. The discussion has
lacked the necessary empirical context to allow legislatures and
courts to thoughtfully develop resolutions to these issuesfree from
sloganeeringandposturing.
This Article provides and analyzes a previously uncollected
dataset that offers guidance on the appropriate rules of law for
conservation easement modification. It examines policy goals in
light of the data to suggest various modification rules that would
be more effective than current practice. The dataset represents a
significant sample of easement modifications that have been made
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during a six year period (2008-2013) and indicates several
findings:. first, modifications have actually been taking place,
despite claims that conservation easements are "perpetual,"
apparently indicating that NPOs need flexibility in at least some
areas; second, most of the changes have been "minor" and have
been either conservation neutral or conservation positive, though
one would expect pressurefor more significant alterations over
time due to shifts in the environment and human needs; third, there
is a range of types and degree of modifications to this point,
suggesting that there should be a spectrum of procedural and
substantive requirements for the different varieties of
modifications; and last, a mandatefor a stand-alone, state registry
of conservation easements and modifications would allow for
improvedpolicymaking.
The Article suggests that a doctrine that requires different
procedures and substantive rules for various categories of
modifications-a sliding scale-may yield the best, policy-based
results. The work also identifies and analyzes existing doctrinesfederal tax law, specific state statutes, charitable trust doctrine,
standing rules, and director liability-that would need to be
alteredor clarifiedto adopt effective modification rules.
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INTRODUCTION
Conservation easements have revolutionized land preservation
in the United States over the past thirty-five years. These interests
restrict landowners from altering the natural, environmental, and
ecological features of their property and have been obtained and
held by nonprofit organizations (NIPOs) to permanently preserve
millions of acres across the country.' The perpetual, cost-effective,
and nongovernmental attributes of conservation easements bring
significant benefits to preservation strategy and execution.
The greatest strength of conservation easements-perpetual
protection of land-also presents, at times, their most significant
challenge. 2 Sometimes circumstances may require alteration of an
easement to a small or major degree rather than perpetual
enforcement of the original terms. For example, relatively minor
changes in conservation easements may be needed to correct errors
and glitches that can arise in any land transfer instrument.
Moreover, the easement document may need to be amended to
clarify the intent of the parties when the original drafting is
unclear. More significantly, the use of land historically has shifted
based on changes in the natural world and evolving human
conditions. This experience raises the questions of whether and
I Our database and this Article focus on NPO-held conservation easements.
Governmental entities are also empowered to hold conservation easements, and
these easements may be acquired by government by donation and by purchase
for consideration (full consideration or bargain sale). See Gerald Korngold,
Governmental Conservation Easements: A Means to Advance Efficiency,
Freedom from Coercion, Flexibility, and Democracy, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 467
(2013) [hereinafter Komgold, Governmental Conservation Easements]; ALIco,
INC., CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K) (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/3545/000089109212005222/e49824 8k.htm (showing sale
of perpetual conservation easement on 11,600 acres in Florida to U.S. Dept. of
Agriculture for $20.7 million).
2 As discussed below, donated easements are typically perpetual because of
Internal Revenue Code requirements. See infra Section IV.A. I. Moreover, under
enabling statutes, there is often a presumption of perpetuity unless the parties
otherwise provide. See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 2(c) (UNIF. LAW
COMM'N 1981). Some conservation easements, often involving governmental

rather than NPO holders, might have limited durations. See, e.g., Long Green
Valley Ass'n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 68 A.3d 843 (Md. 2013) (discussing an
agricultural easement valid only as long as farming is feasible), aff'g 46 A.3d
473 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012); see News Release, U.S. Dep't of Agric., USDA
to Provide $332 Million to Protect and Restore Agricultural Working Lands,
Grasslands and Wetlands (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/
wps/portal/nrcs/detail/pr/newsroom/releases/?cid=nrcseprd334218
(describing
USDA program of thirty year easements).
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how perpetual conservation easements should be modified or even
terminated by future generations in light of a dynamic ecology and
new human needs.
The issue of conservation easement alteration has been
debated over recent years by courts, legislatures, the Internal
Revenue Service, practitioners, and commentators. Some maintain
that conservation easements must be protected in perpetuity, with
modification of the exact terms of a given easement permitted only
under extreme conditions and subject to strict, if not onerous,
procedural guidelines. 3 Others, however, believe that a more
flexible approach to easement terms may be needed in order to
respond to routine errors and to emerging environmental and
human conditions. 4 Supporters of flexibility would allow
modifications only if the NPO continues to administer the
easement within the overall terms of its environmental mission.5
This Article focuses on the issue of consensual modification or
termination, where the NPO holding the easement would agree
with the fee owner of the burdened land to amend or end the
easement. The parties themselves would set the terms of the
modification or termination as well as the amount of consideration
that would change hands (most likely a payment by the fee owner
to the easement holder where the fee rights are enhanced by the
release of the restrictions). 6
See infra Section II.G.1
See infra Section II.G.2
5 See infra note 80 and accompanying text
6 A conservation easement could also be modified or terminated without
consent of all parties. It could be altered by one of the parties acting unilaterally,
perhaps on the theories of violation of public policy, changed conditions, or
relative hardship. See Gerald Korngold, Solving the ContentiousIssues ofPrivate
Conservation Easements: Promoting Flexibilityfor the Future andEngaging the
Public Land Use Process, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 1039, 1077-1080 [hereinafter
Korngold, Contentious Issues]. The easement could be terminated involuntarily,
where government takes it, and perhaps the underlying fee interest, through
eminent domain. See N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAW § 49-0307(l)(c) (McKinney
2015) (allowing modification by eminent domain); 32 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5055(d) (West 2015) (permitting eminent domain taking of
conservation
easement);
GERALD
KORNGOLD,
PRIVATE
LAND
USE
3

4

ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS, REAL COVENANTS AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES
268-71 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter, KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE
ARRANGEMENTS]. The conservation easement could be terminated by operation

of law if the NPO holder goes bankrupt See Cameron Johnson, Note,
PerpetuatingPerpetuity, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 437 (2011) (describing the
bankruptcy of The Environmental Trust, Inc., a nonprofit corporation that held
conservation easements). If the easement is not considered to be a "charitable
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The purpose of this Article is not to add more heat to this
already tendentious debate. Rather, it is our view that too often the
discussion has taken place in a vacuum, with arguments about
"modifications" and "amendments" being mere legal and
philosophical abstractions. For this Article, the authors developed
an empirical dataset of actual amendments to conservation
easements made by a significant sample of land trusts (i.e., NPOs
with the mission of land preservation, primarily through ownership
of conservation easements and fee interests as well) 7 during the

six-year period of 2008 to 2013. We have then classified these
easement amendments by type, which yielded nine categories of
consensual easement modifications.
We believe that this data provides essential context for
meaningful discussion and action on easement modification and
termination. Hopefully, this data can inform and contextualize the
debate over whether amendments and changes in easements should
be permitted, in what type of circumstances, and pursuant to what
procedures and substantive standards. Furthermore, the data might
prove helpful to legislatures and courts on how to approach the
variety of modification issues, now and going forward.
We reach four conclusions from our dataset. First, despite any
claims that conservation easements must remain perpetual and
unaltered, modifications are actually currently taking place.
Changes are part of the reality of conservation easements. This
seems to indicate that land trusts administering conservation
easements require at least some flexibility to achieve their
missions. Second, so far-in the comparatively early years of use
of conservation easements-most of the changes are self-described
by the parties (typically the easement holders) as what might be
called "minor." Importantly, it appears that the modifications
usually have a neutral or net-positive conservation effect. The
alterations are typically depicted as involving correction of the
original easement, often with respect to the legal description of the
property. There have been amendments that increase the size and
scope of the easement restriction, but there have been some
asset," then in case of bankruptcy it could perhaps be sold to the fee owner thus
relieving the fee owner of the restriction. See Reid K. Weisbord, Charitable
Insolvency and Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy Reorganization, 10
BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 305, 311-13 (2013).
7 On land trusts, see RICHARD BREWER, CONSERVANCY: THE LAND TRUST
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (2003).
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amendments that reduce the extent of the conservation restriction
and thus benefit the fee owner. We would expect that the pressure
for more substantial amendments will increase over time as
ecological conditions and human needs evolve. Third, the data
already indicate a range of easement modifications-from
supposed scrivener errors to increased fee owner rights. This in
turn suggests that a "one-size-fits-all" modification procedure may
not be optimal to achieve conservation values, efficiency gains,
and public policy goals. Rather, a jurisdiction might prefer a range
of procedures depending on the category of modification in
question and underlying policies and objectives. For example, for
minor corrective actions, it may be sufficient to have a process that
adequately memorializes the change but does not require the NPO
holder to expend significant funds obtaining approvals. A
jurisdiction might choose, however, to require greater process,
stakeholder involvement, and substantive standards for more
significant alterations or termination. Fourth, the state's
formulation of public policy with respect to land conservation
through easements likely would be improved by achieving
transparency concerning all conservation easements and executed
amendments. This could be accomplished by requiring the
recording of such instruments and the creation of a separate
recording index for them.
Section I of this Article provides background on conservation
easements necessary to understand our data set and ramifications;
it defines conservation easements and how they operate, compiles
the best available data on the number of conservation easements
and acreage, and examines the policies favoring conservation
easements and the concerns with these interests. Section II
develops various scenarios where pressure for modification or
even termination of the original conservation easement may
develop. These scenarios are drawn from our data set, case law,
reports, and some hypotheticals. The Section also examines the
competing perspectives on whether modification should be
pursuant to strict or flexible procedural and substantive rules. Our
data set and findings are presented in Section III. It shows the
overall number of conservation easements, classifies them into
categories, and offers some hypotheses about the data. Section IV
develops and critiques the various doctrines that currently limit
modification of conservation easement agreements. It suggests that
to the extent that decision makers seek to inject flexibility into
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easement instruments along the lines that the data indicate, these
doctrines need adjustment. Restrictions on flexibility include
various provisions in the Internal Revenue Code deduction for
conservation easements, some specific state statutory provisions on
conservation easement modification, the automatic application of
charitable trust law and cy pres to all conservation easements, third
party standing in neighbors to enforce easement agreements,
liability concerns for directors (or trustees) of NPOs, and
organizational concerns of NPOs.
I. BACKGROUND ON CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
Conservation easements are restrictions on land that bar
current and successor owners from interfering with the properties'
natural, ecological, open, or scenic features. 8 Usually, easements
set out a general promise not to interfere with natural attributes and
to maintain the land in its current environmental state. The
documents typically include specific clauses prohibiting building
of additional structures and roads or removal of timber or natural
growth, and may also include affirmative obligations such as
removal of non-native species. 9 Conservation easements do not
8 See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, supra note 2, at § 1(1); see
generally RUSSELL L. BRENNEMAN, PRIVATE APPROACHES TO PRESERVATION OF

OPEN LAND (1967); Gerald Korngold, Privately Held ConservationServitudes: A
Policy Analysis in the Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63
TEX. L. REV. 633 (1984) [hereinafter Korngold, Conservation Servitudes];
Gerald Korngold, Conservation Easements and the Development of New
Energies: Fracking, Wind Turbines, and Solar Collection, 3 L.S.U. J. ENERGY L.
& RESOURCES 101 (2014) [hereinafter Korngold, New Energies]; Gerald
Korngold, Globalizing Conservation Easements: Private Law Approaches for
International Environmental Protection, 29 Wis. INT'L L.J. 584 (2011)
[hereinafter Korngold, Globalizing Easements]; Gerald Komgold, Resolving the
IntergenerationalConflicts of Real Property Law: PreservingFree Markets and
PersonalAutonomy for Future Generations, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1525, 1525-27
(2007) [hereinafter Korngold, Future Generations]; James Boyd, Kathryn
Caballero & David R. Simpson, The Law and Economics of Habitat
Conservation: Lessons from an Analysis of Easement Acquisitions, 19 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 2009 (2000); Zachary Bray, Reconciling Development and Natural
Beauty: The Promise and Dilemma of Conservation Easements, 34 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 119 (2010); Jessica E. Jay, When PerpetualIs Not Forever: The
Challenge of Changing Conditions, Amendment, and Termination of Perpetual
Conservation Easements, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Jay,
PerpetualNot Forever].
9 See Korngold, Governmental Conservation Easements, supra note 1, at
469-70. For affirmative obligations under conservation easements, see UNIF.
CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, supra note 2, at § 1(1) (defining a conservation
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typically grant access to the public.10 The terms of a conservation
easement can be targeted to accomplish an organization's specific
goals. Thus, in recent years, some conservation easements have
required active farming of the subject property in order to maintain
the agricultural tenor of an area.II
In order to resolve doubts as to validity under the common
law, statutes have been passed in the various states to specifically
authorize conservation easements.12 While there is variation,
common features of the statutes include: only NPOs or
governmental entities can hold easements; easements are usually
held "in gross"-the easement holder does not need to own nearby
land directly benefitted by the easement; easements are typically
perpetual, with the Internal Revenue Code making that a
requirement for deductibility; and conservation easements bind
successor owners of the burdened property.13
easement as "imposing limitations or affirmative obligations" to preserve real
property); id. §4(5) (upholding conservation easements even though they may
impose affirmative obligations); id. at Commissioners' Prefatory Note (giving
the examples of a maintenance obligation and affirmative actions to preserve the
property as included within the concept of a conservation easement); ELIZABETH
BYERS & KARIN MARCHETTI PONTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK
76-77 (2d ed. 2005) (describing affirmative rights granted to easement holder,
such as land management and right to conduct scientific studies); id. at 223-24
(describing affirmative obligation of fee owner to maintain a building subject to
a preservation easement); id. at 339 (sample easement provision place
affirmative duty on fee owner to mow and perform related activities on open
fields to preserve scenic views); Peter Morrisette, ConservationEasements and
the Public Good: Preservingthe Environment on Private Lands, 41 NATURAL
RESOURCES J. 373, 399 (2001) (describing affirmative obligations such and
fencing and development of a timber cutting plan).
10 See Komgold, Governmental Conservation Easements, supra note 1, at
470. A limited right of access for the purpose of inspection to determine
compliance may be granted to the easement holder. Id. at 470 n.6.
II See Matt A.V. Chaban, Amid Preservation Efforts, Farmland in the
Hamptons Goes for Other Uses, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/08/05/nyregion/amid-preservation-efforts-farmland-in-t
he-hamptons-goes-for-other-uses.html; Lindsey Lucher Shute & Benjamin
Shute, Keep Farmland for Farmers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/01/opinion/keep-farmland-for-farmers.html.
12 See Komgold, Governmental Conservation Easements, supra note 1, at
470-71. The Uniform Conservation Easement Act was initially approved in 1981
and currently has been adopted by twenty-one states. UNIF. LAW COMM'N,
LEGISLATIVE

FACT SHEET-CONSERVATION

EASEMENT

ACT (2015),

http://

http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Conservation%20Easement%2OAct
(last visited Oct. 21, 2015).
13 See Komgold, Governmental Conservation Easements, supra note 1, at
470-71.
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ConservationEasement Data

There is only limited data on the number, acreage, holders,
and location of conservation easements held by both NPOs and
governments. Current sources of data include the Land Trust
Alliance's censuses of land trusts (a voluntary survey) and the
Form 990 (the annual tax return filed by NPOs under the Internal
Revenue Code). Moreover, in 2011, a consortium of NPOs and
federal agencies launched the National Conservation Easement
Database (NCED) to gather, on a voluntary basis, information
about conservation easements.14 The NCED does not include
easements that are not currently in digital format and it estimates
there are an additional 12,182 easements, covering over 2 million
acres, that have not been entered its database for this reason.' 5
Table 1 sets out the most recent NCED data. This is only an
incomplete picture, as the reporting is voluntary; thus it does not
include all conservation easements held by all NPOs and
governmental units. 16

14

See

NAT'L

CONSERVATION

EASEMENT

DATABASE,

http://nced.conservationregistry.org (last visited Oct. 21, 2015); Easement
DatabaseIs a Big Boost for ConservationEffort, THE TRUST FOR PUBLIC LAND
(Oct. 24, 2011), https://www.tpl.org/media-room/easement-database-big-boostconservation-effort.
15

See NAT'L CONSERVATION

EASEMENT DATABASE,

USER'S GUIDE 8

(2011), http://conservationeasement.us/pdf/NCED UsersGuide_6_8_201 1.pdf.
16 One of the authors has argued for increased legislative action to increase
data collection. See Korngold, ContentiousIssues, supra note 6, at 1070.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal

N.YU. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

12

Volume 24

Table 1. Conservation easement number and acreage held by governmental entities,
NPOs and other type of easement holders. 17

Easement Holder

Count

Acres
as
Percentage

Acres

of Total

Non-Governmental
Organization (including NPOs)
Private

40.48%
75

44,368

0.19%

Federal
Jointly Held

27,299
1,648

5,034,823
979,953

21.28%
4.14%

Local Government

15,694

1,140,130

4.82%

6
281

345
42,387

0.00%
0.18%

30,761

6,330,211

26.76%

1,738

508,351

2.15%

114,218

23,657,399

100.00%

Native American
Regional Agency

State
Unknown Easement Holder

Grand Total

The available data show that there has been tremendous and
continued growth in the number of conservation easements over
the years. The number of acres under conservation easement
reported by members of the Land Trust Alliance grew from several

thousand in 1985 to 8.8 million in 2010.18
B.

The CompetingPolicies

Various public policies support the validation and continued
enforcement of conservation easements. At the same time, there
are some policy concerns about conservation easements that
become more acute with both the passage of time and changes in
ecological conditions and public needs.

17 Source:
NAT'L
CONSERVATION
EASEMENT
DATABASE,
http://conservationeasement.us (last visited July 2015). Percentages are
calculated to two decimal points. At three decimal points, Native American-held
conservation easements equal 0.001 percent.
18

See

LAND

TRUST

ALL.,

2010

NAT'L

LAND

TRUST

CENSUS

REPORT 5 (2011), https://web.archive.org/web/20120122083920/http://www. land
trustalliance.org/land-trusts/land-trust-census/national-land-trust-census-2010/20
1 0-final-report.
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Values Favoring ConservationEasements

1.

a. Efficiency
Conservation easement transactions allow parties to engage in
market transfers for their mutual benefit. Fee owners can convey
their development rights in exchange for cash or valuable tax
benefits, and NPOs can acquire veto rights on development which
they desire. 19 Subsequent buyers of the burdened land who take
with notice of the easement are presumed to consent to it and can
adjust their offers down to reflect the easement's limitations on the
property's use. 20 Such market-based, consensual deals can yield an
efficient allocation of land resources. An NPO can conserve a
property by obtaining an easement rather than spending more to
acquire a fee that the NPO actually does not need to achieve its
preservation goal, and the fee owner can liquidate development
rights it does not wish to retain while continuing to enjoy aspects
of the property, such as using it as a residence. 2 1
b. PropertyRights
Not only do conservation easements serve efficiency goals,
they also are consistent with the concepts of freedom of contract,
respect for property rights, and the notion that people can freely
dispose of their property as they see fit. 22 Owners of land are

entitled to seek personal satisfaction through their free choices
about their land, and so decisions to create a conservation
easement should be respected. The law should trump such
consensual arrangements only in rare circumstances.
c. PrivateAction
When an NPO holds the easement, there may be additional
19 See Komgold, New Energies, supra note 8, at 107.
See Zarlengo v. Comm'r, 108 T.C.M. (CCH) 155, at *10 (T.C. 2014)
(stating that, had a purchaser taken possession before the seller recorded a fagade
conservation easement on the property, the easement would not be binding
because the seller did not give actual notice); McClure v. Montgomery Cty.
Planning Bd., 103 A.3d 1111, 1118 (2014) (purchaser of property subject to
properly recorded forest conservation easement has record notice of it).
21 While state and local land trusts in 1990 held approximately the same
amount of acres (300,000) in fee and under easement, in 2010 they held
approximately four times as much land under conservation easement
(approximately 8 million acres versus 2 million acres). LAND TRUST ALL., supra
note 18, at 5. Easements appear to be attractive to the parties.
22 See Komgold, ContentiousIssues, supra note 6, at 1056.
20
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advantages over governmental conservation. In such cases, the cost
and
monitoring, stewardship,
payments,
of acquisition
enforcement is shifted from government to the NPO. 23 NPOs may
be able to act more nimbly in acquiring and managing an easement
than governmental entities. Moreover, conservation easements
held by NPOs are created by consent of the fee owner, while some
governmental conservation efforts, such as zoning, are coercive.2 4
d. Conservation Values
Finally, the legal validation and popularity of conservation
easements represent a new American attitude towards land that
favors balancing preservation against development rather than
merely favoring full development. 25 Conservation easements have
been lauded for yielding increased social and economic value,
through species preservation, remediation of the atmosphere,
watershed protection, retention of ecological capital, protection of
food security, psychic benefits, and more. 26
2.

Concerns with ConservationEasements

a. The Tax Expenditure
Significant federal, state, and local tax expenditures are often
involved in the creation and holding of conservation easements by
NPOs. It is legitimate to consider whether the public is getting
good value for these subsidies.
A taxpayer receives a federal income tax deduction for a
qualifying donation of a conservation easement to an NPO under
I.R.C. § 170(h). 27 Professor Roger Colinvaux reports that the
federal income tax deductions for the donation of conservation and
23 See id. at 1055. Note, though, that the tax expenditure is borne by
government. See infra Section I.B.2.a.
24 See Korngold, Governmental Conservation Easements, supra note 1, at
477-78 (noting that, while there is no acquisition cost with regulation,
subsequent litigation may add costs). Zoning imposed against public opposition
could also create intangible costs to public morale.
25 See Korngold, New Energies, supra note 8, at 108.
2 6 Id.
27 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 170(h); see generally Kate B. Deal, Note, Incentivizing
Conservation:Restructuring the Tax-PreferredEasement Acceptance Process to
Maximize Overall Conservation Value, 101 GEO. L.J. 1587 (2013); C. Timothy
Lindstrom, Income Tax Aspects of Conservation Easements, 5 Wyo. L. REV. I
(2005); Stephen Small, Real Estate Developers and Conservation Easements, 19
PROB. & PROP. 24 (2005).
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fagade easements equaled $2.18 billion in 2007 and $1.22 billion
in 2008.28 Assuming a tax rate of 35%, this yielded a revenue loss
of $1.19 billion during 2007 and 2008 combined. 2 9 For the period
of 2003 through 2008, Professor Colinvaux estimates a tax revenue
loss due to conservation and fagade easement deductions of $10.21
billion. 30 Table 2 provides information on the extent of
conservation easement donations and their percentage of property
donations during the period 2003-2012.

28

Roger Colinvaux, The Conservation Easement Tax Expenditure: In

Search of Conservation Value, 37 COLUM. J. EVTL. L. 1, 3 (2012). Conservation
easement deductions alone totaled $1.95 billion in 2007 and $1.18 in 2008. Id. at
10. See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 6, at 1057-58 (discussing tax
subsidy and estimating figures). NPOs also acquire easements by purchase rather
than gift, in which case there would be no deduction if full consideration is paid.
See generally The Nature Conservancy v. Sims, 680 F.3d 672 (6th Cir. 2012); In
re Strieter, No. 14-56980, 2015 WL 2215418 (Bankr. Ct. E.D. Mich. 2015).
29 Colinvaux, supra note 28, at 10.
30 Id. For criticism of the expenditure, see Richard Rubin, IRS Cracks Down
on Breaks Tied to Rich Americans' Land, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 8, 2013, http://

www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-11-06/irs-cracks-down-on-break-in-lan
d-of-rich-americans. The federal purse is additionally reduced because the
presence of conservation easements lowers the value of land for estate tax
purposes. See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 6, at 1049.
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3
Table 2. Conservation Easement Donation Data 1

Tax

Total

Year

Donations

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

14,273,171
15,878,310
16,465,082
15,682,030
18,599,215
19,478,520
18,371,824
20,508,458
21,814,286
22,369,208

Total
Easement
s
s
Donation
s
s
2,407
3,365
3,439
4,674
2,647
4,554
2,205
3,241
2,202
1,238

Easemen
t

Total
Donation
Donations
soatue
Vle(n
s Value
Value (in
V
(in
Thousands Tosn
ofDollrs)Thousan
of Dollars)
dso
ds of
Dollars)

36,902,794
37,189,160
41,070,632
46,841,245
52,827,286
34,597,290
27,986,691
34,898,507
38,698,506
42,913,291

1,491,924
1,449,210
2,123,184
1,754,164
2,176,391
1,216,043
1,018,173
765,539
694,696
971,276

Easement
Value as
Pe
as

Percentag

e of Total
Dnais
Donations
Vau
Value

4.04%
3.90%
5.17%
3.74%
4.12%
3.51%
3.64%
2.19%
1.80%
2.26%

Moreover, some states provide income tax deductions or
credits for easement donations. 32 Furthermore, the presence of a
conservation easement reduces the valuation of real estate, thus
reducing the collectable property tax for local and state
government. 33 Government must respond by reducing services or
increasing taxes on other citizens to cover the shortfall. 34

31 Source: I.R.S. STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETINS, Spring 2006, Spring
2007, Spring 2008, Summer 2009, Spring 2010, Winter 2011, Spring 2012,

Winter 2013, Spring 2014, Spring 2015, http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-

SOl-Bulletin-Articles-Index-by-Topic#4.
32

See Komgold, Governmental Conservation Easements, supra note 1, at

471.
See Komgold, Contentious Issues, supra note 6, at 1049.
See generally Christopher M. Anderson & Jonathan R. King, Equilibrium
Behavior in the Conservation Easement Game, 80 LAND ECON. 355 (2004)
33
34

(discussing tax increases to offset revenue loss due to conservation easement).
Some maintain that local government saves money, however, when land is held
for open space rather than used for residential development. See Alex Bridges,
Easement Funding Gains Support, NORTHERN VA. DAILY (Strasburg, Va.), Sept.
4, 2014, http://www.nvdaily.com/news/2014/09/easement-program-fundinggains-support/.
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b. PublicProcess
While some NPOs follow "best practices" on easement
selection, NPOs are not bound to accept conservation easements
pursuant to a public land use plan. This could create a patchwork
of easements that do not add up to a viable community
preservation program.35 Open space and habitat protection is thus
established based on the somewhat random decisions of donors
and donees, not through a broad-based, predetermined community
plan. Moreover, acquisition, stewardship, and other easementrelated decisions are made by private organizations, outside of a
democratic, public process. Because easements can be held in
gross-by organizations not otherwise owning land in the
community-the possibility of outside influence over local land
use decisions may be exacerbated. While there are benefits to nongovernmental ownership and NPO staff and directors are usually
dedicated to the public welfare, there may be times where broader
public participation would be beneficial.
c. Class Issues
There are potential class issues inherent in conservation
easements. The effect, albeit not the intent, of these easements can
be to create "private large lot zoning," limiting the building of
additional, affordable housing. 36 Moreover, even William H.
Whyte, an early and highly visible proponent of conservation
easements, noted the inherent "muted class and economic
conflicts." 3 7 He suggested that easement donors would be the
"gentry" with an interest in natural areas in the countryside rather
than accessible open space for parks and playgrounds. 38
II. SCENARIOS FOR MODIFICATIONS OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS

Courts, regulators, and commentators have viewed the
perpetuity requirement as a hurdle to the modification of an
executed conservation easement, except perhaps in the most
extraordinary circumstances. 39 It may well be that there will never
35 See Komgold, ContentiousIssues, supra note 6, at 1059-60.
36 See id. at 1060.
37 Id. at 1061.
38 Id.
39 See infra Sections II.G.1 (discussing arguments favoring stricter process
and substantive rules for modification) & IV.A. (discussing provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code and accompanying regulations that limit modification).
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be a need or desire for modification of the vast number of
conservation easements-only time will tell. But as with other
consensual land transfer documents, it is likely that at least some
parties or their successors may seek changes at some point in the
future. Moreover, because conservation easements are perpetual,
potential problems lurking in the documents will not naturally
expire with the term of the document. Additionally, with the
passage of time and evolution in environmental and social
circumstances, there will likely be increased desire to adjust some
older conservation easements. Thus, there could well be interest in
future modification of some conservation easements.
Set out below are a few scenarios where the parties to an
executed conservation easement may seek to alter it. These
scenarios are based on examples from our data set, facts of case
decisions, reported examples, and hypothetical scenarios that we
believe are plausible based on industry developments. The extent
of an amendment of an easement may range from minor to
substantial and the effect of an amendment on the conservation
goals of a particular easement may be positive, neutral, or
negative (understandably, many of these terms are value laden and
involve judgment calls). At the same time, the amendment of a
particular easement may have a different net effect on overall land
conservation values in the community and the overall land
conservation program of an NPO; for example, an amendment
weakening a particular conservation easement to a tiny extent in
exchange for a gift of a new conservation easement in the area
arguably will have an overall net positive community and NPO
conservation effect. 40

A.

"Correction"of the OriginalDocument

After a conservation easement has been signed, one or all of
the parties may require an amendment to the easement to "correct"
an error in the original document. This might be a correction in the
legal description of the easement or related property. Or it may be
a "clarification" of the intention of the parties' undertakings and
responsibilities under the easement arrangement, 4 1 to resolve an
40 Buyouts, however, may raise social equity issues if previously restricted
landowners can simply reverse deals by making large payments.
41 See Wetlands America Trust, Inc. v. White Cloud Nine Ventures, L.P., 88
Va. Cir. 341 (2014) (describing attempts of parties to reach agreement as to
whether permission to build "farm" structures in the original easement included a
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ambiguous provision or to avoid a potential dispute; 42 arguably,
this could entail substantive changes of the original text of the
conservation easement couched as mere "clarification." Our data
set contains examples of easement corrections. Assuming that
corrections and clarifications do not alter the parties' original
intent, it seems fair to characterize these amendments as minor.
B.

Specific Changes to Accomplish Overall Intent

Particularly with the passage of time, a deviation from a
specific provision of a conservation easement may be necessary in
order to achieve the articulated overall intent of the easement. For
example, a conservation easement dedicated to maintaining a
property's natural flora may also bar the use of chemical
herbicides. 4 3 In the face of an aggressive invasive species and the
failure of natural deterrents, the easement holder might seek
easement modification to allow the use of chemical herbicides to
protect the land.
C.

Mission Serving Changes

There are numerous scenarios in which an NPO might be
confronted with an offer to modify conservation easements in
order to better serve its mission, conservation values, and the
community. Consider just these two examples among many.

1.

Conflict with Other ConservationLand

One actual situation has been reported where the federal
government sought to add land to a national wildlife preserve. 44
All stakeholders were in favor, as it would be a major conservation
winery; arguably such an agreement could be viewed as a modification rather
than a simple clarification of the original language).
42 See Memorandum from Robert Klein, Chair of the Easement Amendment
Working Group, to Members of the General Assembly 3 (Jan. 15, 2013),
(addressing
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/reports/2013ExtemalReports/285680.pdf
the Vermont General Assembly).
43 See generally McEvoy v. Palumbo, CV106002253S, 2011 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 2939 (Nov. 15, 2011) (describing a situation where a town owned a
conservation easement over property that prohibited owner from disturbing the
natural habitat. At the owner's request, Town Selectmen voted to permit the
owner to remove invasive species and to mow a portion of the land. McEvoy,
who owned another property in the town, brought suit against the Town and
owner to enjoin the mowing on the basis that such an action violated the terms of
the easement.).
44 See Klein, supra note 42, at 3.
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advance for the community and the NPO players. The sticking
point, however, was that the land was subject to a conservation
easement held by an NPO and federal regulations require that the
government can only acquire land with clear title. In such a
situation, termination of the easement would arguably serve the
public interest but was barred by law.
2.

Swaps for Higher Conservation Value Land

The fee owner of land burdened by a conservation easement
may suggest a swap to the NPO holder: the NPO would modify or
release the easement in exchange for an easement on other land of
the fee owner that has higher environmental value or a greater
number of acres. 4 5 Alternatively, the fee owner may offer cash for
the modification or release of the easement that the NPO could
then use to acquire other conservation land that better serves the
NPO's mission (perhaps contiguous to other lands it holds, higher
ecological importance, etc.). The swap could enhance overall
societal conservation goals by protecting more important land and
would free less valuable conservation land for development. 46
Importantly, the swap would serve the mission of the NPOthe holder of the easement. The NPO, utilizing its expertise, would
determine the wisdom of the swap in light of its mission and
strategy. The conservation easement concept is predicated on the
empowerment of non-governmental actors to seek, acquire, and
administer easements as private actors. Like all nonprofit
decisions, fiduciary duty would apply to swap decisions and the
IRS could withdraw the NPO's tax exempt status for violation of
nonprofit norms. 47 But consistent with the conservation easement
ethos, NPOs would be free to act according to their mission and
45 See generally Klein, supra note 42, at 3 (cemetery expansion example).
46 See generally Jessica Owley, ChangingProperty in a Changing World: A
Call for the End of Perpetual Conservation Easements, 30 STAN. ENVTL L.J.
121, 158-59 (2011) (discussing a situation where a land trust traded a 3.8-acre
lot that it held in fee for a 16-acre plot held by a developer. The developer
planned a housing development on the 3.8-acre plot, despite a restriction
requiring the land to be open to the public. The 16-acre lot was larger, possessed
unique environmental features, and would be open to the public).
47 For a discussion of fiduciary obligations of nonprofits and IRS
supervision, see infra Sections II.G.2 & IV.C.1; I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling
201405018
(Jan.
31, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/1405018.pdf
(revoking tax exempt status of organization formed to hold conservation
easements because it was not operated exclusively for tax-exempt purposes but
as a conduit for the president to allow his clients to obtain deductions).
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their vision of how to best achieve land preservation. Moreover,
knowledge and best practices in land conservation continues to
evolve, providing new understanding of what lands should be
acquired and continued in preserved status. Conservation
organizations should be able to apply current science to their
decisions about amending conservation easements.
Nonprofit boards have the duty to make such decisions
regarding their assets, including real property, in the regular course
of serving their missions. 4 8 Unfortunately, courts have held that
swap provisions in conservation easement documents prevent
deductibility of the donation of an easement under the Internal
Revenue Code, thus chilling the swap option in many situations.4 9
D.

Competing EnvironmentalGoals

Land conservation through conservation easements represents
one aspect of the environmental ethos. Another strain is the drive
to increase the use of renewable energy sources, such as wind
turbines and solar, in order to reduce the overall carbon footprint,
prevent depletion of resources, and reduce spillovers of carbonbased or nuclear energy.50 Most often these environmental goals
can co-exist, but at times there can be a conflict between the
preservation goals of a conservation easement and a renewables
project. For example, wind turbines can run directly counter to the
standard purposes of conservation easements because the former
can interfere with habitats and wildlife, create noise, kill local and

&

48 See, e.g., Sharon Otterman, Helping to Building a Schoolfor the Poor, by
Selling One in a Wealthier Area, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2014 (discussing how the
Children's Aid Society sold an Upper East Side pre-school building to acquire a
location for a charter school in the South Bronx); Matt A. V. Chaban, A
Sprawling Manorfor $125, 000 (Some Disassembly Required), N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
10, 2015, at A19 (describing a preservation society offering a historic home for
sale as its maintenance costs burdened other society activities).
49 See Belk v. Comm'r, 140 T.C. 1 (2013), aff'd, 774 F.3d 221 (4th Cir.
2014); Bosque Canyon Ranch, L.P. v. Comm'r, T.C.M. 2015-130 (T.C. 2015). It
could be argued that Belk should be limited to situations when the easement
document itself specifically provides for a swap, but that swaps that arise sui
generis over time might be treated differently. In light of the court's opinion and
26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(6), discussed infra notes 129-132, this might be a
distinction without a difference.
50 Various state policies support renewables. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16a35k; Jeffrey D. Moss, Solar Panels, Tax Incentives, and Your House, PROB.
PROP., Jan.-Feb. 2010, at 17, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/publications/probatepropertymagazine/v24/01/2010_aba rpteppv24_1
articlemoss.authcheckdam.pdf.
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migratory birds, and mar vistas. 5' The siting of solar fields may
also create negative environmental impacts. 52 Thus, a conservation
easement might need to be altered to accommodate a proposed
renewable project on land protected by the easement. 53
One reported analogous land dispute highlighted the conflict
between preservation and renewables development. When a
company sought to lease federal land in the Mojave Desert to build
wind farms and solar plants, Senator Dianne Feinstein introduced
legislation to bar such projects because local citizens were
concerned about the effect on scenery and natural land features.
The New York Times quoted Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. as saying that
"this is arguably the best solar land in the world, and Senator
Feinstein shouldn't be allowed to take this land off the table
without a proper scientific environmental review." 54
E.

The Effect of Climate Change

Climate change has already had a significant negative impact
on lands, habitats, and species.55 Moreover, climate change may
51 See generally Fairwindct, Inc. v. Conn. Siting Council, No.
CV116011389S, 2012 WL 5201354 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2012); GPH Cohasset
LLC v. Trustees of Reservations, No. 11 MISC 446618(AHS), 2013 WL
3022390 (Mass. Land Ct. 2012); In re Green Mountain Power Corp., 60 A.3d
654 (Vt. 2012); see also Katharine Q. Seelye, A 12-Year Duel Over A Wind
Farm, N.Y. TIMES, October 23, 2013, at A12; Peter Schworm & David Filipoy,
Flicker Shadows From Wind Turbines Draw Complaints, BOSTON GLOBE, April

5, 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/04/04/turbine-flicker-effectdraws-complaints/UKgf7nOwMHm8CWAtZ47V5L/story.html, last visited Oct.
1, 2013 (explaining shadow flicker); Dan Frosch, A Struggle to Balance Wind
Energy with Wildlife, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2013, at A18 (bird kills); Diane
Cardwell, U.S. Offshore Wind Farm, Made in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2014, BI (interference with view).
52 See generally Save Panoche Valley v. San Benito County, 158 Cal. Rptr.
3d 719 (Cal. App. Ct. 2013).
53 See Eileen M. Adams, Residents to Decide on Town Ownership of Lots,
SUN JOURNAL (Me.), Dec. 1, 2009, 2009 WLNR 24232103 (reporting on town
meeting to discuss rescinding town's conservation easement so that six wind
towers could be built).
54 Todd Woody, Desert Vistas vs. Solar Power, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2009,
at B1.
55 See Felicity Barringer, Climate Change Will Disrupt Half of North
America's Bird Species, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2014, at A14; Burt
Helm, The Climate Bottom Line, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2015, at Bus. 1; Michael
Wines, Climate Change Threatens to Strip the Identity of GlacierNational Park,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2014, at A20; Verlyn Klinkenborg, Forever Wild, NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC MAG., Summer 2011, http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2011/09/
adirondack-park/klinkenborg-text (last visited Aug. 13, 2014).
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destroy the ecological value of property that is under conservation
easement restrictions. The director of the California Academy of
Sciences in 2008 observed that "[w]e have over a 100-year
investment nationally in a large suite of protected areas that may
no longer protect the ecosystems for which they were formed." 56
Commentators have suggested that enforcement of original
conservation easement terms may no longer be sensible if ongoing
climate change degrades the environmental value of preserved land
and its natural habitat, causes out-migration of protected species,
or spurs the rise of invasive species on the property.57 If there is
little or no conservation benefit remaining from the original
easement, the sensible approach would be for the fee owner to pay
the NPO holder of the conservation easement to ease the
restrictions to align them with the current ecological condition of
the property or even terminate the NPO's rights. The NPO could
then reinvest these sums on other conservation projects and the fee
owner could make increased productive use of the newly less
restricted land.
F.

Competing Social Needs

A fee owner may seek the modification or termination of a
conservation easement to devote the land to a conflicting use that
is socially important. For example, the owner may wish to build
affordable housing that is in desperately short supply in the
community, an economic development project that will provide
important jobs in an area suffering unemployment, or a needed
medical facility. The fee owner would pay for the release of the
easement, enabling the NPO easement holder to acquire other
important preservation fees or easements while the formerly
restricted property can be used to meet societal needs.
One news item, for example, reported on a conflict in
Woodstock, New York, between proponents of a proposed
56 Cornelia Dean, The Preservation Predicament, N.Y. TIMES, January 29,
2008, at FI (quoting Healy Hamilton).
57 See Julia D. Mahoney, PerpetualRestrictions on Land and The Problem
of the Future, 88 Va. L. Rev. 739, 753-57 (2002); Owley, supra note 46, at
153-54; Duncan M. Greene, Note, Dynamic Conservation Easements: Facing
the Problem of Perpetuity in Land Conservation, 28 SEATELE U.L. REV. 883,
905-07 (2005); see generally J.L. Olmstead, The Butterfly Effect: Conservation
Easements, Climate Change, and Invasive Species, 38 EVNTL. AFFAIRS 41 (2011)
(discussing how climate change causes species to become invasive into new
climate zones and the benefits of dynamic conservation easements).
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affordable housing rental development and persons concerned with
the possible ecological damage from the construction." The town
supervisor said the resistance was because "people don't want
change." 59 One elderly resident of a nearby town observed that
"[w]hat they have now is mostly city people who can afford it. Us
little folks can't."6 0
There is an intergenerational concern here as well, as
changing conditions may shift priorities. While many today quite
reasonably see environmental degradation as the fundamental
challenge facing the planet now and for years to come, and
celebrate all that we can do to avert environmental disaster, the
future is unknown. We must be careful that in imposing our best
vision for the world based on our current ideas and understanding,
we do not foreclose the future citizens of our planet from making
decisions about the world that they and their children must inhabit.
G.

The Challenge: Findingthe Process and the Standard

These scenarios for consensual amendment or termination of
conservation easements provoke a series of questions as to the
appropriate process, procedures, participants, and substantive
standards for the modification of conservation easements. The fee
owner and the holder of a "regular" easement such as a right of
way (or the successors of both) can simply agree to alter the
easement as they see fit. 6 1

Is this model appropriate for the

modification of donated conservation easements or should there be
special procedures and guidelines? For example, if a public charity
is involved, should the approval of the state's attorney general be
required for modifications, or even a court action and judicial
approval? Because of the potential effect on the local environment,
should neighbors have special standing to contest changes? In
order to protect the public's interest in the environment, should
58 Peter Applebome, In Woodstock, Values Collide Over Housing, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2011, atA27.
59

Id.

60 Id. Currently, some courts are interpreting whether the language of certain
conservation easements prohibit subsurface energy development through
hydraulic fracturing from adjacent parcels. See Komgold, New Energies, supra
note 8. It is possible that evolving conditions in the future favoring energy
security might lead to a challenge of even a clear prohibition of such energy
development.
61

See KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 6, at

256-58.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal

CONSERVATION EASEMENTS

2016

25

changes be barred unless the purpose of the easement is no longer
achievable?
As developed below, legislatures, courts, and commentators
have suggested a variety of positions for the process, procedures,
participants, and substantive standards for conservation easement
amendment, alteration, and termination. 62 These are typically onesize-fits-all rules, to be applied in all cases of easement
modification, and they range from positions quite opposed to
changes to those that are more receptive. 63
The alteration examples and hypotheticals developed in
Section II above, as well as the data on easement modification
described in Section III, indicate that the nature of the easement
changes that will likely develop over time will range from minor to
major. Given that there is no monolithic scenario in terms of
importance, motivation, scope, and effect of the proposed
modification, perhaps a unitary procedure and substantive rule for
all easement alterations might not produce optimal policy results.
Rather, decision makers might develop a continuum of procedures
and substantive rules depending on the nature of the easement
amendment. This may best achieve desired conservation and goals.
There are thoughtful policies supporting both sides of the
question of whether the process and substantive rules for easement
modification by current interest holders or successors should be
flexible or strict. These policies often reflect some of the
competing values inherent in conservation easements in general
which are discussed above. 64 It seems, however, that no single
policy is overriding and controlling in all cases. Different
considerations will prove to be the most compelling in some
situations but not others depending on the type of proposed
change. For example, concerns over administrative and legal
expenses for the nonprofit may be paramount when correcting
legal descriptions but not if termination of an easement is
proposed. Decision makers-legislatures and courts-may well be
advised to build their procedural and substantive rules based on the
paramount policy of the category of modification that they are
considering.

62 See infra Section IV.
63

See id.

64

See supra Section I.B.
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StricterProcess and Substantive Rules

There are several reasons supporting stricter procedural and
substantive guidelines for the modification of conservation
easements. First, there is a concern that the public will lose the
benefit of its tax subsidy if a modification allows the conservation
easement to be weakened or dissipated. 65 Requiring more process
and third party approvals, and permitting changes only in limited
circumstances, might help to prevent such losses to the public
purse. 66

Second, the public policy favoring conservation easements, as
exemplified by the adoption of enabling statutes in all states,
should be respected. Conservation easements are recognized
property rights that should not be easily compromised or
dismissed. Moreover, the underlying assumption of conservation
easements, indeed the default requirement under many statutes, is
that they should have unlimited duration. 67 For those who would
like conservation easements to remain exactly as they were
created, strict procedural and substantive standards would limit
changes. 68

Additionally, it is claimed that the public interest in
conservation is better served through a public process controlling
modifications rather than private agreements between NPO holders
and fee owners. 69 A court-supervised public process may be
necessary to prevent political and economic pressure from forcing

65

See Ann Taylor Schwing, PerpetuityIs Forever, Almost Always: Why It is

Wrong to Promote Amendment and Termination of Perpetual Conservation

&

Easements, 37 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 217, 239 (2013); Nancy A. McLaughlin
W. William Weeks, In Defense of Conservation Easements: A Response to the
End ofPerpetuity, 9 WYo. L. REV. 1, 27-28, 55-56, 80-82 (2009).
66 See 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(1) (contemplating termination only if
conservation easement is impossible or impracticable).
67 See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, supra note 2, at § 2(c). See
Schwing, supra note 65, at 234 (noting that conservation easements "imposed by
land trusts are routinely intended and normally required to be perpetual").
68 See generally Schwing, supra note 65, at 218 ("[T]he law is clear:
Easements are solicited and granted in perpetuity, to be amended or terminated
only in extraordinary circumstances and to be terminated only with court
approval or through condemnation."); McLaughlin & Weeks, supra note 65, at 5.
69 See Schwing, supra note 65, at 241 ("The further one deviates from a true
judicial proceeding to extinguish a tax-deductible easement, the less protection
there is for donors, the public, and federal taxpayers."); see generally
McLaughlin & Weeks, supranote 65, at 70-71.
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Moreover, modification procedures and standards should be
sufficiently rigorous and transparent to generate public confidence
in the process and the actions of holders. The public esteem for the
conservation easement vehicle and the reputation of land trusts in
general could be damaged if a few bad actors engage in abusive
modifications and terminations.
Finally, it has been argued that the intent of the conservation
easement donor compels that modification and termination should
be strictly limited. 7' Some have claimed that easement donors "are
principally motivated by a desire to protect the specific land they
love." 7 2 Flexible modification procedures and substantive rules, it
is asserted, would hurt conservation efforts and violate legal
standards:
Having acquired an easement based on promises of perpetuity,
land trusts are obligated to fulfill those promises by federal tax
law, by charitable trust principles, by fiduciary duty to donors,
by the terms of the conservation easement, and by the practical
reality that future donations will dry up if promises are known
to be breached. 73
2.

Flexible Process andSubstantive Rules

There are various arguments supporting more flexible
procedures and substantive rules for at least some types of
modification conservation easements by current and future fee and
easement owners. First, greater process, such as judicial approval
or even simply obtaining consent from a state official, entails
increased time and expense for NPOs. 74 This presents a strain on
70 Nancy McLaughlin & Mark Machlis, Protecting the Public Interest and
Investment in Conservation: A Response to Professor Korngold's Critique of
ConservationEasements, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1561, 1580 (2008).
71 Certainly, some donors are motivated to perpetually preserve the specific
property which they donated. See, e.g., PortlandMuseum ofArt PurchasesLand
to Preserve Homer's View of the Sea, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Me.), Sept. 8,
2014, 2014 WLNR 24770680 (describing how art museum purchased land
surrounding Winslow Homer studio to protect view to the sea and donated
conservation easement on it to land trust).
72 See Schwing, supra note 65, at 237.
73 See Schwing, supra note 65, at 238-39. As developed below, others
disagree on whether charitable trust doctrine and its particular fiduciary duty
apply automatically to gifts of conservation easements. See infra Section IV.C.
74 The granting of standing to neighbors to sue an NPO for alteration of an
easement complicates the negotiations and the likelihood of compromise and
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resource-constrained NPOs. 75 Even major NPOs with large
budgets and their donors would likely prefer to invest
organizational resources in direct preservation activity, rather than
in compliance that brings negligible or no benefits to the public.
Second, the fundamental conservation easement concept and
the impetus behind enabling statutes across the country is that
nonprofits have particular expertise, energy, and capability to seek,
acquire, and retain conservation easements. 76 An understanding
that conservation should not be left only to government and that
the NPO sector can be a major catalyst for the land preservation
effort led to the passage of easement statutes and the IRC
deduction. The data on easement acquisition, described above,
shows the successful track record of NPOs in easement creation. 77
Thus, some argue that many modification decisions are also best
left to the NPOs: they continue to have the expertise and
knowledge of best practices in conservation and can make the best
decisions about modification. 78 A state attorney general or a trial
judge, no matter how well evidence may be presented, cannot have
the depth of knowledge and experience in these matters equal to
the NPO. 79 Moreover, the expense and uncertainty of obtaining

approval for all modifications can discourage the NPO from
experimenting with new approaches and may dissuade it from
developing creative best practices in land preservation. There is a
strong legal history of courts and legislatures deferring to
association and corporate decision makers for these reasons.8 0
Underlying this desire for procedural and substantive
flexibility in at least some types of modification decisions is the
lesson of history: the human condition and the environment
increases costs to the NPO. Moreover, it allows private parties (the neighbors) to
leverage a public good for their own benefit, hardly the purpose behind a
charitable gift and IRC deduction. See supra Section I.A.2.a.
75 See C. Timothy Lindstrom, Hicks v. Dowd: The End of Perpetuity?, 8
Wyo. L. REv. 25, 79, 81-82 (2008) [hereinafter Lindstrom, End of Perpetuity];
While 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(c)(1) requires that an NPO have adequate
resources to enforce an easement in order for the deduction to be valid, this does
not mean that the organization should expending funds needlessly on
administrating the easements.
76 See Komgold, Contentious Issues, supra note 6, at 1085-86.
77 See supra Section I.A.
78 See Lindstrom, End ofPerpetuity, supra note 75, at 80 n. 228.
79 See Lindstrom, End ofPerpetuity,supra note 75, at 80 n. 227.
80 See, e.g., Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Corp., 75 N.Y.2d 530 (1990)
(applying business judgment rule to housing cooperative board decisions).
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evolve, creating new challenges, needs, and opportunities. The
scenarios presented in Section II above are but a few examples of
this dynamism, and there are likely to be others. Good drafting of
the original conservation easement may anticipate and provide for
those changes that the parties can contemplate at the present." But
no matter how thorough and extensive a real estate document may
be, a circumstance unforeseen by the parties can always arise. 82
Such an event is even more likely with legal documents and
obligations lasting into perpetuity. Fallible human beings are
drafting the documents-indeed, a substantial number of the
modifications of our dataset were required to correct errors in
conservation easement documents. While most conservation
easements may stand the test of time, the inevitability of new and
unforeseen circumstances and the potential needs of future
generations support flexibility.
Moreover, flexibility also allows for a state-based solution,
rather than a national one. A rigid, uniform rule is likely not the
best response. Each state has particular needs based on its situation
and open space availability. Our laboratory of federalism should
allow for different solutions on modification and termination and
other state-law issues related to conservation easement. 83 For
81 Schwing, supra note 65, at 242; see Wetlands America Trust, Inc. v.
White Cloud Nine Ventures, L.P., 88 Va. Cir. 341 (2014) (parties included
clause acknowledging that they could not address all circumstances that might
arise in future but stating overall purpose to protect property's natural, scenic,
and open condition in perpetuity).
82 See Sidney G. Saltz, Drafting Made Easy, 15 PROB. & PROP., May-June
2001,
at 31,
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/probate_property
magazine home/rpptpublicationsmagazine 2001_01 mj0 1mjsaltz.html ("Of
course the title of this article is a misrepresentation. There is no easy formula for
drafting real estate documents, but there are some methods that can be followed
to make them less ambiguous, easier to read, easier to negotiate and less prone to
future dispute."); Alex Iliff et al., The Shifting Sands of Contract Drafting,
Interpretation, and Application, 32 CONSTRUCTION LAWYER 31, 32 (2012)

("Many construction projects are immensely complex-with durations measured
in years of performance through winters of snow, springs of rain, and summers
of blistering heat. Without the benefit of clairvoyance, parties have choices: ...
(3) leave gaps.. . . The third may seem the most frightening, but it is also
inevitable. At a certain point, the cost and time required to address every
potential issue and to allocate the possible risk for those issues in the contract
become too large, and the parties must leave certain questions unanswered.").
83 See generally Jessica E. Jay, Understanding When Perpetual is Not
Forever: An Update to the Challenge of Changing Conditions, Amendment, and

Termination of PerpetualConservationEasements, and Response to Ann Taylor
Schwing, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 247, 249 (2013) [hereinafter Jay, Response]
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example, states with significant federal open lands may have
different concerns than a highly-developed state with limited
remaining open space.
Finally, it may be argued that existing rules controlling NPOs
are sufficient to prevent misconduct and no special procedural and
substantive rules are necessary for at least many modifications of
conservation easements. The Internal Revenue Service prevents
revenue loss by policing NPOs for failure to fulfill their
obligations under section 501(c)(3), such as situations of personal
inurement of directors or officers or failure to operate the
organization for its tax exempt-i.e., mission-related-activities. 84
The IRS has revoked the 501(c)(3) certification of an NPO
improperly acting with respect to conservation easements.8 5
Moreover, state law typically empowers the attorney general to
bring actions against board directors for breach of fiduciary duty
and to set aside improper board actions. 86 Often, specific
legislation requires board process87 and court or attorney general
approval if a nonprofit disposes of all or substantially all of its
assets, which should include conservation easements. Under this

(suggesting that differences in state law may not permit a unilateral approach).
84 See Lindstrom, End of Perpetuity, supra note 75, at 78, 83; I.R.C. §
501(c)(3); 26 C.F.R. 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (prohibition of private inurement); see
generally 26 C.F.R. § 1.503(a)-i; 9 MERTENS LAW OF FED. INC. TAX., EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS §§ 34:134,135, 187 (Westlaw, updated May 2015).
85 See
I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr.
Rul.
201405018
(Jan.
31, 2014),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/1405018.pdf (revoking tax exempt status of
organization formed to hold conservation easements because it was not operated
exclusively for tax-exempt purposes but as conduit for the president to allow his
clients to obtain deductions); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC
AFFAIRS, D.C. FEDERAL COURT BARS COMPANY FROM PROMOTING ALLEGED
TAX SCHEME INVOLVING IMPROPER EASEMENTS ON HISTORIC BUILDINGS (2011),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/dc-federal-court-bars-company-promoting-alleged
-tax-scheme-involving-improper-easements (barring defendants from promoting
valuations and accepting easement donations where they have reason to know
there is inadequate conservation purpose).
86 See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. L. § 720(b) (McKinney).
87 See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. L. § 509(b) (McKinney); see generally
Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity FiduciaryLaw, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 1463
(1998); Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law,
CorporateLaw, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593 (1999).
88 See N.Y. Not-For-Profit Corp. L. §§ 511, 511-a (McKinney); N.Y. STATE
OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., CHARITIES BUREAU, A GUIDE TO SALES AND OTHER
DISPOSITIONS OF ASSETS PURSUANT TO NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATIONS LAW §§
510-511 AND RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS LAWS § 12 (2014), http://

www.charitiesnys.com/pdfs/sales-and-other-dispositions of assets.pdf.
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view, donations of conservation easements are not considered gifts
in trusts triggering special requirements, unless specific language
of trust is employed. 89
III. WHAT THE DATA REVEAL

Discussions and debates on whether conservation easements
can and should be modified have appropriately addressed legal and
public policy considerations. What has been missing, however, is
consideration of actual data on the number and types of easement
modifications that have been actually be made. This project has
collected and classified a detailed national sample of modifications
that have been made to conservation easements over a six-year
period. The data indicate, importantly, that whatever commentators
and lawmakers may think about the issue in the abstract,
modifications have been taking place in reality and seem to reflect
NPOs' need for flexibility in at least some conservation easement
scenarios. Moreover, the data indicate the range of situations in
which modifications have been needed through these early years of
conservation easement history. This data, therefore, should inform
policy makers on the questions of whether conservation easements
should be subject to modification and the process and substantive
rules that might apply. We believe that this and future data should
be a central reference in the discussion.
The goal of the data collection was to identify actual
amendments of conservation easements that easement holders and
fee owners have made, to get a sense of their magnitude relative to
the stock of easements held by a selected sample of leading land
trusts (i.e., NPOs with a land preservation mission), and to better
understand the types of easement alterations being made by the.
parties. The IRS provides the only publicly and realistically
available raw source of data about the number and type of
modifications made to existing conservation easements. 90 This
information is found in the tax returns (Schedule D of the Form
89 See infra Section IV.C.
90 Theoretically one could find modifications that were recorded with the
county recorder's office but it would require that the searcher know that there
had been a modification, the parties actually recorded the modification, the
searcher knows the precise names of the parties to the modification document
(for a grantor-grantee index), and other information-making the attempt to track
down modifications in a jurisdiction a herculean task if not a practical
impossibility.
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990) that tax-exempt organizations are required to file annually
under the Internal Revenue Code. 9 1 Our research and database
focuses on consensual modification or termination of conservation
easements, where the parties agree to a change, as opposed to
unilateral termination by eminent domain or foreclosure. 92
A.

Overall Methodology

Schedule D of the 990 Form requires the filer to state its total
number of conservation easements, total acreage under easement,
and, importantly, the total number of easements "modified,
transferred, released, extinguished, or terminated." 93 The Schedule
requires the filer to provide descriptions for such modifications,
transfers, releases, extinguishments, or terminations. 94 As
described below, we built a data set to show the number of
changes, but we also classified the types of easement alterations
based on the information that the land trusts themselves provided
in the Forms 990. These descriptions of modifications provide
insights into the changes fee owners and easement holders are
confronting.
Given the large number of NPOs that hold conservation
easements, we focused attention on a select group of forty-nine
land trusts throughout the United States. Our working hypothesis
was that land trusts with large holdings of acres under easement
would be more likely to encounter situations that required
modification or termination of easements. Using information from
the Land Trust Alliance (LTA) 2010 Census of land trusts across
the United States, 95 we identified the land trust in each of forty91

See Daniel Halperin,

Incentives for Conservation Easements: The

Charitable Deduction or A Better Way, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 36-37

(2011); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Perpetual Conservation Easements in the 21st
Century: What Have We Learned and Where Should We Go From Here?, 2013
UTAH L. REV. 687, 699-70 n.45 (2013).
92 We also found 10 terminations by or in lieu of eminent domain and one
by foreclosure but as these are not consensual modifications, they are not
included in our database.
93 I.R.S. Schedule D (Form 990), Part 11 (2015), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f990sd.pdf. Additional information on whether there is a written monitoring
and enforcement policy, staff and volunteer hours spent in monitoring and
enforcement, and compliance with I.R.C. §170(h) is also required by the
Schedule.
94 See id at Part XIII.
95 See LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, NAT'L LAND TRUST CENSUS REP.: A
LOOK
AT VOLUNTARY
LAND CONSERVATION
IN AMERICA (2010),
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nine states 96 with the highest number of acres under conservation
easement that filed a Form 990 in 2008.97 These forty-nine land
trusts became our sample set, and we followed this group over all
six years. 98
We have confidence in our methodology because we
compared the number of modifications made by the land trusts in
our sample with a much larger dataset purchased from Guidestar in
2012.99
The Guidestar dataset included every tax exempt
organization that answered "yes" to the Form 990 question asking
whether the organization held a conservation easement in the most
current form year (which included 2010 and 2011).1oo There were a
total number of 1,480 organizations in this dataset, reporting 270
conservation easement modifications. The forty-nine land trusts in
our sample, representing just 3 percent of the 1,480 organizations
in the Guidestar dataset, were responsible for 15 percent of the
total conservation easement amendment activity reported in the
dataset. We interpreted this as support for our intuition that land
trusts with large holdings of acres under easement are more likely
http://s3.amazonaws.com/landtrustalliance.org/page/files/20 1 OLandTrustCensus.
pdf. Tables accompanying the LTA Census are on file with the authors.
96 With the exception of North Dakota, where we were not able to identify a
land trust.
97 If the land trust with the highest number of acres under conservation
easement in the state did not file a Form 990, we selected the land trust with the
second highest number of acres under easement.
98 In a few cases, the land trust with the highest number of acres dropped out
of the top spot in ensuing years. We elected, however, to follow the original
forty-nine land trusts because all remained major easement holders and we
believed that there was a benefit in following the same entities on the theory that
they may have maintained consistent internal modification policies. Moreover,
the IRS permits the filing of a short return 990-EZ rather than the long Form 990,
based on certain financial limits of the NPO. The- IRS criteria for who must file
the long 990 form, rather than the short return 990-EZ, can vary from year to
year. Information about conservation easements modification is only reported in
Schedule D of the long 990 form. Because of the yearly variations in the IRS
filing criteria, a few of the land trusts we studied did not meet the threshold for
filing the long Form 990 in a given tax year, which leaves some minor gaps in
our dataset.
99 Guidestar, among other services, aggregates data from Forms 990. See
GuideStar Presents Most Important, Comprehensive Nonprofit Information in a
New,
Easy-to-Understand Format, GUIDESTAR
(Jan.
26,
2012),
http://www.guidestar.org/rxa/news/news-releases/2012/1-26-12-new-nonprofitreports.aspx.
100 Form 990, Part IV, line 7: "Did the organization receive or hold a
conservation easement, including easements to preserve open space, the
environment, historic land areas, or historic structures?"
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to encounter the need to amend conservation easements.
The data that we present are subject to certain caveats. First,
we relied on information reported by the organizations themselves
in Schedule D of their Forms 990 that they submitted to the IRS, as
to the number of modifications that they made and related details.
Second, as an important related matter, we relied on the NPO's
own description of the modifications which they self-reported in
their 990 forms. Third, the choice of how to categorize and classify
some of the particular modifications necessarily involved some
degree of exercise of our judgment based on the information
available in the forms. When there was inadequate information for
us to make what we felt was a rational judgment, we placed the
easement in the "Reason Unknown" category. Finally, our study
does not assess, and is not intended to imply any question about,
the validity, legality, or appropriateness of any specific
modification that we examined, either under governing documents
or the law. We simply attempted to classify the self-reported data
on the Schedules D.
B.

Number ofModifications: Data and Findings

We tracked the conservation easement modification activity
of the forty-nine land trusts in our sample as reported in tax returns
for calendar years 2008-2013.101 During this six year span, 388
easements were altered, of which 377 were by consensual
agreement. The highest percentage of changes in the dataset
occurred in 2008 and it represented 1.42 percent of the total
number of conservation easements held by the forty-nine land
trusts that year. Table 3 shows the number of alterations each year
relative to the total conservation easement count.

101 When available, Forns 990 for calendar years 2008 through 2013 were
obtained for each land trust.
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Table 3. Percentage of Total Conservation Easements that Were Modified for 49 Land Trusts

Total

Total

Year

Conservation
Easement

Conservation
Easement

Count

Modifications

2008
2009

6,698
7,726

95
74

1.42%
0.96%

2010

8,622

50

0.58%

2011
2012
2013

8,507
8,769
8,722

56
52
61

0.66%
0.59%
0.70%

Percentage of Total Conservation
Easements Modifications

The total amendments constitute a small proportion of the
total conservation easement portfolio held by NPOs in our sample.
The noteworthy takeaway, however, is that amendments are
actually taking place. The fact that conservation easements are in
fact being modified runs counter to the paradigm of perpetuity.
Because easement alteration is a reality, one would hope that there
could be a serious, policy-based dialogue about substantive and
procedural rules for amendments that could lead to direction from
decision makers.
C.

Type of Modifications: Data and Findings

In addition to exploring the scale of amendment activity
among these land trusts, the study also sought to identify and
classify the type of amendments that land trusts are actually
making to existing conservation easements. 0 2 After reviewing
descriptions of these modifications provided in the Forms 990, we
classified them into the following nine categories: add new acreage
(usually by the fee owner) to the original conservation easement;
correct the description of the nature of the restriction or rights
granted to the easement holder or retained by the fee owner;
correct an error in the legal description of property; increase the
rights of the fee owner, in effect lessening the power of the
easement restriction; amend the easement to achieve compliance
with tax requirements; increase the extent of conservation

102 Descriptions of the modifications are included in Form 990 Schedule D,
Part XIV, or in Schedule 0 of the IRS return.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal

36

N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAWJOURNAL

Volume 24

restrictions; transfer the easement to or from another NPO or
governmental unit; new exchange of rights between the fee owner
and easement holder; and reason unknown (either no description is
available in the Form 990 or the description does not clarify what
type of modification is being made). 10 3
Many of the categories are self-explanatory, such as adding
acreage to the original conservation easement area, increasing the
extent of the conservation restrictions, and correcting the legal
description (assuming a simple scrivener's error). Other
classifications require additional explanation and can best be
explicated by reference to actual examples from the Forms 990
themselves:
* Correctdescription of rights: these modifications are stated as
corrections to -the original easement document necessary to
clarify the extent of the restriction granted to easement holder
or the rights retained by the fee owner. While not expressly
stated, these descriptions seem to have read as if they are
correcting a "scrivener's error" in the original document.
Some examples of this type of modification include, in the
words of the 990s: "conservation easements were amended to
correct an error that had been made in the list of water rights
tied to the property;" "two easements were amended to
include the percent ownership attributed to state agency cospecifically
holdings;" "the correction was needed to . .
acknowledge a 60 foot road right-of-way easement along the
southern edge of the property that existed prior to the date of
conveyance of the conservation easement."
* Increase fee owner's rights: this type of modification can
fairly be read as increasing the rights of the fee owner beyond
those envisioned by the original conservation easement
document. Such amendments resulted in the decrease of the
conservation restrictions and expansion of the fee owner's
rights. Examples from actual descriptions in Forms 990
include: "one easement was amended to allow a baptismal
addition to the church to penetrate 600 sq. ft. of the 1.29 acre
conservation easement;" "revise permitted uses - added a farm
103 While on one level, the transfer of a conservation easement may not
appear to be a modification of the terms of the easement, we discovered that a
number of the stated explanations for transfer could have an effect on the
administration of the easement. For example, the transferee could better monitor
because of proximity or greater expertise.
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labor housing clause for use by those engaged in the farming
operation;" "reconfigure project - allowed a subdivision and
separate conveyance of the two non-contiguous parcels and
reconfigured the exclusion."
* Compliance with tax requirements: sometimes a change was
agreed to in order to qualify for a state tax program. Examples
include: "second amendment to [another] amendment adding
the Georgia Tax Credit Program language to the conservation
easement;" "four easements were amended to change the
language required by the Georgia Certification Tax Credit
Program."
* New exchange of rights between fee and easement owners: in
some situations, the modification appears to strike a new
bargain between the fee owner and easement holder with
respect to aspects of the easement restriction. There may be
give and take on both sides, increasing some fee owner rights
in exchange for granting restrictions elsewhere. Examples
from the Forms 990 include: "this second amendment
acknowledges the grantors reserved right to replace a former
house on the south side of Allen Lake. The amendment
further granted the ability to relocate this house site away
from Allen Lake to an upland planted pine area delineated on
a map (exhibit a) made part of the amendment;" "added the
right for one farm labor house, relocated the existing
farmstead complex, reduced the size of the farmstead
complex from 3 acres to 1 acre, capped the size of the
residence permitted in the farmstead complex at 1800 sq. ft.[,]
eliminated the farmstand complex, extinguished the existing
seasonal camp right, permitted a driveway to the new
farmstead complex; released from the protected property one
acre of land with a house located in the farmstead complex
and in exchange, added to the protected property one acre of
land with an existing house located southerly of town
highway #21 and subject to the restriction that the house be
limited to no more than 2500 square feet of total floor area."
Table 4 shows the distribution of amendments by type. It is
important to note that the last category, reason unknown, is the
largest partly because we were not able to locate the full Form 990
for some NPOs, while others declare only the number of
modifications without providing additional details in their tax
returns.
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The dataset provides some important findings. First, even in
the relatively early years of conservation easement history, NPOs
are engaged in a fairly wide range of conservation easement
amendments. The variety of changes, from ministerial (correcting
legal descriptions) to more significant (new exchange of rights),
suggests that different legal standards and procedures should be
employed in assessing the validity of such changes. Second, the
majority of modifications in our dataset appear to have a neutral or
net-positive conservation effect (fifty-one amendments added
acreage, forty-seven increased conservation restrictions, thirty-two
were transferred to another NPO or governmental organization,
fifteen corrected description of rights, and fifty-two corrected legal
descriptions of property). 0 4 This may well support the theory that
NPOs need some degree of flexibility to exercise their expertise in
pursuing their missions through conservation easements. Third,
there seems to be some willingness by at least some easement
holders to exchange or decrease easement rights, hopefully for
increased conservation values elsewhere, but whether an effective
process was followed is not clear from the data. Legislatures and
courts need to develop practical and transparent rules to address
realistic pressures for change to prevent erosion of donated
easements. Finally, the variety of desired alterations may grow
from the already robust spectrum of modifications described in our
data, as time, the environment, and human needs evolve. This may
support the development of a range of substantive and procedural
requirements for various types of modifications, rather than a onesize-fits-all approach.

IV.

RESTRICTIONS ON MODIFICATION AND TERMINATION OF
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS

The data set in Section III and scenarios in Section II indicate
a wide range of situations in which the holder of a conservation
easement and the burdened fee owner may agree to alter the terms
of the original conservation easement document. This Section
examines various legal doctrines and organizational factors that
104 These five categories (totaling 197) represent 79 percent of the
modifications, after deducting the "reasons unknown" category (127) from the
total modifications (377). Even including the "reasons unknown" category,
which skews the results since it is likely that some of the unknown modifications
were conservation neutral or positive, the five categories comprise 52 percent of
the modifications.
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may discourage if not preclude the consensual modification of
conservation easements. These include: the tremendous incentives
of the Internal Revenue Code, which permits modification only
under highly limited circumstances; some specific state legislation
limiting alteration of conservation easements; the automatic
application of charitable trust law and the cy pres doctrine to all
conservation easements, which creates an expensive process and a
high substantive bar for modifications; expansive third party
standing rules that allow neighbors and others to enforce these
easements, making compromise harder; and concerns over liability
by nonprofit directors (trustees) who seek to negotiate changes. To
the extent that legislatures and courts wish to provide for flexibility
in conservation easements through modifications, either through a
unitary rule or a sliding scale approach, these decision makers will
have to address and modify the following legal doctrines that
prevent such changes.
A. Internal Revenue Code
The tax benefit granted by the Internal Revenue Code for
donated conservation easements is arguably the major driver for
the perpetual duration of conservation easements and strict
limitations on modifications. The Internal Revenue Code provides
major tax benefits to donors of conservation easements through
income tax deductions.10 5 The IRC requirements necessary for an
easement to qualify for deductibility has profoundly influenced the
substantive provisions included in donative easement documents.
Most particularly, in order to meet the requirements of the Code
and Regulations, donative conservation easements are created for
an unlimited duration and contemplate amendment or modification
only in the most unusual and extraordinary circumstances. With
few exceptions, state law does not mandate this, 106 and arguably
good conservation planning does not require unlimited duration
with stringent limits on flexibility in all situations. 107
105 There are other federal tax benefits: for example, the reduction of the
value of the property due to the placement of a conservation easement lowers the
estate tax exposure. See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 6, at 1049.
106 For those few jurisdictions that limit modification as a matter of state law,
see infra Section IV.B.
107 State property tax law may influence other substantive provisions of
conservation easements. For example, there have been some unsuccessful
challenges to charitable exemption for property tax purposes on land held for
conservation purposes where there is no public access. See, e.g., New England
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The I.R.C. PerpetuityRequirement

The Internal Revenue Code provides for deductibility of
qualified gifts of conservation easements. Section 170(h) provides
that a taxpayer can deduct for federal income tax purposes the
value of a "restriction" 0 8 "exclusively for conservation
10 nonprofit
purposes" 09 donated by the taxpayer to a "qualified"o
organization."' The allowance of a deduction for a conservation
easement-a less-than-fee interest in real property-is an
exception to the general rule that a taxpayer may not deduct the
value of a contribution that is less than the taxpayer's full interest
in the property.1 12
Importantly, for the issue of duration, modification, and
termination, the Code has, since 1977, imposed a perpetuity
requirement on conservation easements in two ways: a
conservation restriction must be "granted in perpetuity" and a
contribution will not be treated as exclusively for conservation
purposes unless "the conservation purpose is protected in
perpetuity." 1 3 The Regulations currently make clear that only
perpetual conservation easements, restrictive covenants, or
equitable servitudes will qualify for deductibility under the
Code.1

14

There was a period, though, where deductions were permitted
for non-perpetual conservation easements. Under the 1976 version
Forestry Found. v. Bd. of Assessors, 9 N.E.3d 310 (Mass. 2014) (reversing lower
court denial of exemption); Francis Small Heritage Tr. v. Limington, 98 A.3d
1012 (Me. 2014) (allowing deduction for easement with access). If such a
challenge is successful, however, it may lead some organizations to prefer
conservation easements with a right of public access though this is currently not
the norm. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
108 I.R.C § 170(h)(2)(C).
109 I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)(C).
110 1.R.C. § 170(h)(1)(B). See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 6, at
1049.
Ill These elements are defined in the statute and regulations and provide
various interpretational and application issues not directly relevant to questions
of modification and termination. They include, for example, the definition of
conservation purposes. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(d).
112 See Schmidt v. Comm'r, No. 1743-12, 2014 WL 3866066, at *8 (T.C.
Aug. 6, 2014); Belk v. Comm'r, 140 T.C. 1 (2013), aff'd, 774 F.3d 221 (4th Cir.
2014).
113 I.R.C § 170(h)(2)(C) and (5)(A); Jay, Perpetual Not Forever, supra note
8, at 6. See Belk, 140 T.C. 1 (emphasizing the dual requirements of perpetual
property interest and conservation purpose).
114 See 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(b)(2).
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of the IRC, deductibility was allowed for easements that lasted
thirty years or longer." 5 The Tax Reduction and Simplification
Act of 1977 removed the deductibility of such easements and
stated the current perpetuity requirement.1 6 The legislative history
and reasoning for Congress's embrace and subsequent rejection of
deductibility for non-perpetual easements is not clear. The
Conference Report to the 1977 Act simply stated that while
deductions for conservation easements were extended, "the
conference agreement does not allow a deduction for contributions
for conservation purposes after June 13, 1977, of leases, options
and easements which are not perpetual.""' One commentator has
suggested that, while there was debate among conservation groups,
the change occurred because "[r]epresentatives from land
conservation organizations apparently had convinced the Treasury
that term easements would not result in the long-term protection of
land for conservation purposes because land subject to a term
easement was likely to be developed at the expiration of the
term."1 18 It has also been suggested that some conservation
organizations believed that the availability of the thirty year
deduction option reduced the nonprofits' leverage to bargain with
donors for perpetual conservation easements and protection.119
One can imagine, moreover, that the Treasury and Congress were
concerned with revenue loss without corresponding social benefit
that could arise where owners with an intent to only develop their
land in the future received public conservation subsidies and then
simply built after the thirty year period as they had planned all
along. Finally, given the difficult experience in valuation of
perpetual conservation easements over the prior twenty-five
years, 120 adding the variable of limited duration easements seems
115 See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2124(e)(1), §
170(f)(3)(B)(iii), 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
116 See Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 309(a), 91 Stat. 126, 154 (1977), codified at 26
U.S.C.A. § 170.
117 H.R. Rep. 95-263 at 30-31 (1977) (Conf. Rep.).
118 Nancy A. McLaughlin, Increasing the Tax Incentives for Conservation
Easement Donations-A Reasonable Approach, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 13 (2004)
[hereinafter McLaughlin, Tax Incentives] (citing Stephen J. Small, The Tax
Benefits of Donating Easements on Scenic and Historic Property, 7 REAL EST.
L.J. 304, 316 (1979)).
119 See McLaughlin, Tax Incentives, supra note 118, at 13 n.39.
120 See, e.g., Comm'r v. Simmons, 646 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Butler v.
Comm'r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1359 (T.C. 2012); Hughes v. Comm'r, 97 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1488 (T.C. 2009).
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to increase complexity for taxpayers and the IRS.1 2 1
The Regulations seek to ensure perpetuity of the conservation
restriction in several ways. First, the donor's retained property
interest must be "subject to legally enforceable restrictions ... that
will prevent uses of the retained interest inconsistent with the
conservation purpose of the donation." 22 A deduction will not be
disallowed, though, "merely . .. because the interest . . . may be
defeated by the performance of some act or the happening of some
event, if on the date of the gift it appears that the possibility that
such act or event will occur is so remote as to be negligible."l 23
Second, the lien of any mortgage on the property must be made
subordinate to the conservation easement, so that foreclosure of the
mortgage will not erase the conservation right. 124
2.

LR.C. Limits on Easement Modifications

Not only do the Code and Regulations require perpetual
easements, they contemplate deviation only in strictly
circumscribed situations. The Regulations provide that if there is
an "unexpected change in the conditions surrounding the property"
that "can make impossible or impractical the continued use of the
property for conservation purposes," the conservation purpose will
still be considered as having been protected in perpetuity-and the
deduction still proper-if the restrictions "are extinguished by
judicial proceeding," the property sold, and the donee
organization's portion of the proceeds are used in a manner
consistent with the contribution purpose of the original gift.1 2 5 A
121 See generally Theodore S. Sims, Qualified Conservation Restrictions:
Recollections of and Reflections on the Origins of Section 170(11), 33 UTAH
ENVTL. L. REV. 41, 45-46 (2013) (describing the benefit of permitting donation
of a full interest as matching the fair market value of the claimed deduction to the
value of the interest passing to the recipient). On the difficulty in valuing
conservation easements in general, see Esgar Corp. v. Comm'r, 103 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1185 (T.C. 2012).
122 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(1).
123 Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(3).
124 See id. § 1.170A-14(g)(2); see also Kaufman v. Comm'r, 687 F.3d 21 (1st
Cir. 2012); Minnick v. Comm'r, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 755 (T.C. 2012).
125 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(6); see Irby v. Comm'r, 139 T.C. 371 (2012)
(applying this provision and finding that clause that required the nonprofit holder
to repay its share of proceeds on extinguishment to another nonprofit that
provided the funding for the bargain purchase of the easement did not prevent the
easement from qualifying). As a related matter, a donee organization may
transfer a conservation easement only if transferring to another qualifying
organization and if the transferring organization requires the transferee comply
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fair reading of the statutory language "extinguished" indicates that
only termination, rather than modification or amendment, of a
problematic conservation easement is contemplated.1 26 A direct
reading of the Regulation would seem also to require the
termination of an existing easement rather than its modification or
amendment,1 27 despite the modem trend towards empowering
courts to modify other types of land servitudes.1 28
Moreover, the standard for permissible extinguishment is
strict. Extinguishment of a conservation easement is possible only
if the easement is "impossible or impractical," foreclosing the
possibility of modifications where there is no impossibility or
impracticality but the conservation goals of the organization or the
easement itself would be furthered by a change (such as a small
release of the easement in exchange for the addition of high
conservation-value acreage to the original easement).
Finally, the language indicates that a judicial proceeding
would be required for extinguishment, rather than any less formal
process. The IRC apparently would not permit consensual changes
between the parties without court action and all that it would
entail. A modification not in compliance with § 170 would
seemingly expose the taxpayer to scrutiny of past returns where the
now "improper" deduction was taken, potential loss of tax benefits
and the determination of a deficiency, and possible penalties. 12 9
3.

The Cases

The cases decided under the Code and accompanying
Regulations have read the extinguishment provisions narrowly.
One recent Tax Court case, for example, held that no deduction
was permitted under the "remote future event test" of the
Regulations because it was inevitable that the easement would
terminate under existing state legislation that limited duration of
easements to ninety-nine years. 130 Federal tax deductions would
with the conservation restrictions. 26 C.F.R.

§ 1.170A-14(c)(2).

126 See Jay, PerpetualNot Forever,supra note 8, at 10-11.
127 See id.
128 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 7.1 (2000); KORNGOLD,
PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS, supranote 6, at 419-24.

129 See Internal Revenue Bulletin 2004:28, Notice 2004-41 (July 12, 2004),
http://www.irs.gov/irb/2004-28_IRB/arO9.html; Belk v. Comm'r, 140 T.C. I
(2013), aff'd, 774 F.3d 221 (4th Cir. 2014) (IRS sought deficiency for three prior
years' tax returns because on non-compliance with § 170).
130 Wachter v. Comm'r, 142 T.C. 140 (2014).
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thus not be available for such conservation easements in that
jurisdiction (North Dakota). Another court held that where the fee
owners did not immediately record a conservation easement, the
possibility that a hypothetical third party could have purchased the
property and defeated the easement because it lacked notice of it
was not an occurrence "so remote as to be negligible."1 3 1 The
easement thus was not perpetual and a deduction was not
appropriate until the time the easement was recorded.
In Belk v. Commissioner, the Tax Court rejected the notion of
"floating easements"-a structure that would allow the fee owner
to subsequently remove restrictions from certain pieces of a tract in
exchange for placing them on other portions.1 32 The developer of a
402 single-family home development placed a conservation
easement on a 184-acre golf course serving the development. The
easement, held by a local land conservancy, expressly provided
that the developer could substitute an equal or lesser area of land
contiguous to the original easement area provided the conservancy
believed that it had the same or better ecological stability as the
original land. The Tax Court found that the perpetuity requirement
had not been complied with, even though the conservancy had to
assent:
Because the conservation easement agreement permits
petitioners to change what property is subject to the
conservation easement, the use restriction was not granted in
perpetuity. Petitioners did not agree never to develop the golf
course. Under the terms of the conservation easement,
petitioners are able to remove portions of the golf course and
replace them with property currently not subject to the
conservation easement. Thus, petitioners have not donated an
interest in real property which is subject to a use restriction
granted in perpetuity.1 33
The fact that the conservation purpose would continue
perpetually after the substitution was not sufficient since the
statute also requires that the conservation interest must be
protected perpetually and the developer was proposing to terminate

Zarlengo v. Comm'r, 108 T.C.M. (CCH) 155 (T.C. 2014).
140 T.C. 1 (2013), aff'd, 774 F.3d 221 (4th Cir. 2014); see Balsam
Mountain Investments, LLC v. Comm'r, 109 T.C.M. (CCH) 1214 (T.C. 2015)
(following Belk).
133 Belk, 140 T.C. at 10-11.
131

132
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it on a portion of the golf course.1 3 4
The Tax Court relied on a close reading of the Code in Belk to
find that the substitution arrangement in the easement document
prevented deductibility. This decision clearly reduces flexibility
for easement arrangements. But Belk was decided on a specific set
of facts, where the conservation easement document from the
outset contemplated substitution and that substitution was for the
developer's benefit. Such an arrangement arguably appeared to be
an overreach by the developer-donor, where it obtained the
easement deduction but retained control of the land for its
development purposes. If, however, there had been no such control
retained in the easement document, but the fee owner and the
conservancy in the future negotiated a mutually beneficial
substitution arrangement, there is a possibility that the court's
decision could have been different. In the hypothetical case, the
real property interest would indeed be protected in perpetuity by
the initial agreement as required by subsection (h)(2)(C), unlike in
Belk, and the conservation purpose would be maintained in
perpetuity as mandated by subsection (h)(5) through its existence
on a substitute parcel.
4.

Going Forwardwith the I.R.C.

The Internal Revenue Code and its Regulations provide
powerful disincentives for modification of conservation easements.
Alteration of a conservation easement, except perhaps in certain
narrow circumstances, may cause the donor of an easement to lose
tax benefits under section 170. Because so many conservation
easements are funded through the tax expenditure of the Code, its
provisions provide a potent limitation on amendment of
conservation easements. Easement acquisitions for market price
rather than donations, however, will not be so affected. To the
extent that more flexibility in the alteration of donated
conservation easements is desired, it appears that changes will be
required in section 170(h).
B.

Specific State Statutes on ConservationEasement Alteration

Although most states have not done so, a few jurisdictions
have passed statutes or regulations providing specific procedures
and substantive standards for the consensual amendment and
134

Id. at 11, comparing I.R.C.

§§ 170(h)(5) and (h)(2)(C).
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termination of conservation easements by the easement holder and
fee owner. 135 These provisions typically make the modification
determination a matter for more than just the fee owner and
easement holder by involving additional stakeholders and
imposing substantive standards. Thus, this type of legislation or
regulation usually requires the attorney general to represent the
public in a more formal process and a consideration of the public
interest in the conservation values of the land. These statutes and
regulations offer instructive, albeit differing, models for
legislatures and courts in other jurisdictions to consider when
seeking the right balance between conservation easement
flexibility and strong adherence to initial easement terms.
From the initial passage of its conservation easement act in
1956, Massachusetts has required that termination of an NPO-held
easement must be approved by the local governing body and a
designated state bureau. 13 6 Partial releases of the easement would
be covered though it is unclear that the statute controls other
modifications of easements. 13 7
Other provisions on conservation easement alteration are
more recent. In 2007, Maine revised its conservation easement
statute to require that all new easements must indicate the holder's
power to agree to termination or modification of the easement. 138
Moreover, a court must approve a proposed termination or any
modification that will "materially detract from the conservation
values" protected by the easement. The attorney general must be a
party to this action. In making its determination, the court must
consider the public interest. It would seem that parties operating
under this statute would face significant risk as to whether a
proposed modification would require judicial approval or whether
it could be executed without such process because terms like
"materially detract" and "conservation purpose" are at least
somewhat ambiguous or very broad.
135 Jay, Perpetual Not Forever, supra note 8, at 43-57; Jay, Response, supra
note 83, at 253, 260. In addition to the statutes cited in the following notes, see
also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:8B-5 (requiring public hearing before release of
conservation easement); N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAW § 49-0307(1) (providing
that a conservation easement can be modified only as provided in instrument, by
eminent domain, or pursuant to general statutory provision providing for
termination of restrictions that provide no substantial benefit).
136

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 184,

§

32.

137 Jay, PerpetualNot Forever, supra note 8, at 45.
138

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §477-A.
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Other state schemes provide a sliding scale for review of
proposed modifications depending on the nature of the change and
its effect on the original conservation purpose of the easement.
New Hampshire's attorney general has imposed this system
through a regulation under the attorney general's power to oversee
charitable trusts: the attorney general determined that all gifts of
conservation easements with specific charitable purposes made to
NPOs constitute charitable trusts and are thus subject to oversight
of the attorney general.' 39 Under this regulatory scheme, easement
amendments are characterized as "low," "more," or "high" risk to
the initial conservation purpose. "Low" risk changes may be
approved by the attorney general via a "no action" letter, while
"high risk" modifications would require a cy pres proceeding, with
participation by the attorney general and a judicial determination.
The regulation provides various definitions of what constitutes the
different risk levels.
New Hampshire's sliding scale of scrutiny for easement
modifications provides an intriguing model for accommodating
many of the competing policies invoked by consensual alteration
of conservation easements.1 40 It avoids the one-size-fits-all
approach and associated inefficiencies, inordinate expense,
overkill, and rigidity while preventing revenue and conservation
loss for the public. Although the New Hampshire model is rooted
in the assumption that charitable trust law applies-a notion
rejected by others-141 the sliding scale concept can be adopted
legislatively without relying on charitable trust law.1 4 2
C.

Charitable Trust Doctrine and Cy Pres

The question of whether charitable trust doctrine
automatically applies to all gifts of conservation easements has
been perhaps the most controversial issue in the area of easement

139 Jay, PerpetualNot Forever, supra note 8, at 47-49.
140 See supra Section Il.G.2. For discussion of Vermont's efforts to establish
a sliding scale for easement amendment similar to that of New Hampshire, see
Jay, Response, supranote 83, at 260.
141 See infra Section IV.C.2.
142 One suspects that the attorney general needed to utilize charitable trust
law as the basis for the attorney general's regulatory program because the
attorney general had jurisdiction over charitable trusts. The legislature, however,
has general police power over conservation easements, without a need to ground
it in charitable trust law.
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modification and termination. 14 3 If a donation of a conservation
easement (or other property) to an NPO is viewed as an absolute
gift, the organization has significant discretion in administering the
easement. If, however, the gift is considered to be made in trust to
the NPO (or subject to a condition), then the charitable trust
doctrine applies. Under charitable trust doctrine, there are
substantive limitations on the NPO's ability to alter the easement;
changes must be approved by a court in a cy pres proceeding, and
third parties, such as the attorney general and perhaps others, will
have standing to challenge the proposed modification or
termination. 144 Application of charitable trust doctrine invokes
tradeoffs of the policy considerations discussed above: increased
costs for NPOs, loss of flexibility and innovation in conservation
arrangements, and potential rigidity in light of evolving reality
versus continued adherence to the original terms, avoidance of
revenue loss, respect for easements as property interests, and
protection of the public's and donor's interests.
1.

Legal Ramifications

While the comparisons between an NPO's obligations with
respect to an absolute gift and a charitable trust donation could
entail lengthy consideration, there are several salient points for the
purpose of this Article. First, charitable trust doctrine would permit
modifications of a conservation easement only if unforeseen events
143 See, e.g., McLaughlin & Weeks, supra note 65 (supporting use of
charitable trust law); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the PerpetualNature of
Conservation Easements, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 421, 434-35 (2005);
Schwing, supra note 65, (supporting use of charitable trust law); C. Timothy
Lindstrom, Conservation Easements, Common Sense and the Charitable Trust
Doctrine, 9 WYo. L. REV. 397 (2009) (rejecting the use of cy pres); Lindstrom,
End of Perpetuity, supra note 75 (rejecting cy pres); Matthew J. Richardson,
Note, Conservation Easements as Charitable Trusts in Kansas: Striking the
AppropriateBalance Among the Grantor'sIntent, the Public 's Interest, and the
Need for Flexibility, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 175 (2009); Jessica E. Jay, Third-Party
Enforcement of Conservation Easements, 29 VT. L. REV. 757 (2005). For an
excellent, thoughtful analysis of this issue, see Jay, PerpetualNot Forever,supra
note 8.
144 Cy pres is doctrine applied by courts when the specific purpose of a
charitable trust becomes impracticable or impossible of accomplishment. In a cy
pres proceeding, the court may direct that the proceeds of the trust should be
directed to a new specific purpose "as near as" the original one, keeping within
the overall general purpose of the trust. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §
67 (2001); GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., BOGERT'S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§§ 431-37 (3d ed., rev. 2008).
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made the performance of the terms impossible or impracticable. 145
This would prevent modifications in the many scenarios described
earlier in this Article, especially those that would enhance overall
conservation or social goals, as long as the original easement
remained viable according to its terms. Moreover, there is
increased process. A judicial cy pres proceeding would be required
for a modification, 14 6 with the attorney general, 147 and perhaps
members of a small class of persons intended to be benefited by
the trust,1 48 empowered to participate in the proceeding. The
process will entail expense, time, and risk for an NPO seeking a
modification.
If the gift is absolute, these substantive and procedural
guidelines will not control. The NPO is required to act responsibly
within other legal controls, as described above.1 49 But the NPO
will have increased flexibility with respect to potential
amendments:
In the case of the absolute gift full ownership of the property
given vests in the corporation, subject to the duties imposed
upon it by its charter or articles of incorporation and by the
terms of any agreements it makes by contract or in its
acceptance of a qualified gift. The Attorney General has the
power, as a representative of the state and by quo warranto or

other proceedings, to compel the corporation to perform these
duties, but he acts in a different capacity than as enforcer of
charitable trusts. 150
2.

Is CharitableTrust Treatment Automatic?

Although various proponents have suggested that any gift of a
conservation easement to an NPO creates a charitable trust, others
disagree.'' Moreover, statutory and other legal sources are
indefinite and also in conflict.1 52 Comments to uniform acts and
restatement provisions are nonbinding and provide at best
ambiguous support for automatic application of charitable trust
§ 399 (1959).
Id. § 399 cmts. d, e.
Id. §391 cmt. a.
Id. § 391 cmt. c.
See supra Section II.G.2.
150 See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 144, § 324.
151 See supra note 140 (citing commentators).
152 See Korngold, Governmental Conservation Easements, supra note 1, at
508-12.
145
146
147
148
149

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
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rules.' 53
Case law is scarce and not particularly helpful. For example,
Long Green Valley Ass'n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., a closely
watched Maryland case, held that an agricultural easement
purchased by the state did not create a charitable trust that would
give other parties standing to enforce it.' 5 4 The case on some levels
supports those that oppose automatic treatment of conservation
easements as charitable trusts. The opinion states that a charitable
trust will arise only on the showing by clear and convincing
evidence that the transferor intended that the transferee would hold
the property for a charitable purpose for the benefit of the public.
The court found no such intent in this limited duration agricultural
covenant, for which the state paid consideration. Because of these
facts, however, the case has limited application on whether there
was charitable intent in the typical gift of a perpetual easement to
an NPO.
A gift of a fee interest to an NPO could be absolute or subject
to a condition. Thus, a historical building could be donated without
condition to a school or given under a condition that it be held and
used as a library. The gift under condition is treated like a
charitable trust, and cy pres would have to be applied for the
school to alter the use where there is a specific condition of use.' 5 5
Cy pres would not be required if the school decided to sell the
building under the first scenario, however, as long as the directors
complied with fiduciary duty and the mission was served. Perhaps
the most salient lesson of Long Green Valley is the Maryland high
court's foundational understanding that, as with the gifts of fee
interests, not all transfers of conservation easements to NPOs
create charitable trusts. Rather, the intent to create a charitable
trust, manifested by the holding of property under a fiduciary duty
to accomplish a charitable purpose, must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence.1 56 Absent that showing, there is not
charitable trust.

153

See Korngold, Governmental Conservation Easements, supra note 1, at

511 n. 190.
154 Long Green Valley Ass'n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 68 A.3d 843 (Md. Ct.
App. 2013), aff'g, 46 A.3d 473 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012).
155 See Komgold, Governmental Conservation Easements, supra note 1, at
509.
156 68 A.3d at 857.
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More Mud in the Waters

For those claiming that the donation of a conservation
easement to an NPO always creates a charitable trust, consider this
riddle: suppose that, instead of donating a "conservation easement"
to preserve open space, the donor conveyed as a gift a traditional,
common law "easement of view" to an NPO owning adjacent
land. 157 The terms of the "easement of view" prohibit the grantor
from building anything that would interfere with the view across
the donor's property. Would that transfer without more create a
charitable trust? If not, how is that different than if the grantor had
labelled the document "conservation easement" which proponents
claim would create a trust?158 If the transfer of the "easement of
view" does create a charitable trust, then why doesn't every
transfer of real property to an NPO create a trust-something that
we know is not the case?' 59 The lesson, it seems, is that a hard and
fast rule that all conservation easements create charitable trusts
cannot be harmonized with other doctrines of property law.
4.

CharitableTrusts vs. the Sliding Scale

The hunt for vague textual shibboleths supporting or
countering the treatment of conservation easements as charitable
trusts seems counterproductive.' 6 0 It turns the issue from a needed
open discussion over policy and the crafting of bespoke solutions
in light of specific problems into a binary debate of whether a
conservation easement is a charitable trust, or not. This may result
in overkill-application of the charitable trust framework where it
does not make sense in light of the extent of the changes and other
policies-or "underkill"-the loss of some charitable trust
protections where they are needed in light of the facts and
proposed changes. A sliding scale approach offers a better, policybased alternative than the one-size-fits-all method of the choice of
157

See KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 6, at 7-

10 (describing easements of view).
158 See generally Kepple v. Dohrmann, AC 34056, 2013 Conn. App. LEXIS
126, at **15-16 (Mar. 12, 2013) (court noting similarity of easement of view and
conservation easement).
159 See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 144, § 324 (describing the difference
between an absolute gift to NPO and a charitable trust). See also Newhall v.
Second Church & Soc. Of Boston, 209 N.E.2d 296 (Mass. 1965); In re Myra
Found., 112 N.W.2d 552 (N.D. 1961).
160 See Korngold, Governmental Conservation Easements, supra note 1, at
511 n. 190.
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charitable trust doctrine, or not.
D.

Third Party Standing

Some statutes permit third parties to have standing to enforce
conservation easements.1 61 Presumably legislatures granted third
party standing in many situations to create "private attorneys
general"-to empower persons with a greater interest in the
violation of an easement to bring actions that will benefit the
public as a whole by preserving the conservation values. This
theoretically serves conservation goals.
Third party standing raises several concerns, however, as it
could create an impediment to consensual modifications of an
easement by the holder and fee owner. The third party could bring
an action to enforce the easement as originally written, thus calling
into question the validity of the modification. Moreover, third
party standing allows an interested party, such as a neighbor, to
convert a public right-the easement-into a private right. For
example, the neighbor could be enforcing the original easement,
even though a modification would be beneficial to the public and
conservation in general, because the change has a negative effect
on the neighbor's land.1 62
In Bjork v. Draper, for example, an NPO holder of a
conservation easement created by the current fee owners'
predecessors and the current fee owners agreed to a modification
of the easement.1 63 The NPO agreed to permit an addition of 1,900
square feet, rather than the 1,500 square feet permitted by the
easement, and the fee owners agreed to replace the house's
aluminum siding with wood thus restoring it to original condition.
161 See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/4; 32 PA. STAT. § 5055(7); see
Thomas Celona, Montgomery County Lands Trust Sued, Accused of Failing to
Enforce Easement, THE PHOENIX REPORTER & ITEM (Pa.), Feb. 17, 2011, http://
www.phoenixvillenews.com/article/PV/20110219/NEWSO1/302199966; Jeremy
Roebuck, Montgomery County Lands Trust Caught Between Wealthy Feuding
Neighbors, Phila. Inquirer, Mar. 4, 2011, at Al.
162 Strict standing requirements also prevent the judiciary from deviating
from cases and controversy requirement, see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992), and help to ensure active pursuit of cases since the
result may create precedent that binds other actions through res judicata and
collateral estoppel, see Douglas v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 13 A.3d 669,
673 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).
163 886 N.E.2d 563 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); see also Bjork v. Draper, 936 N.E.2d
763 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (affirming an appeal of the trial court's decision on
remand).
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The parties also agreed to landscaping changes, and they agreed to
release the easement on 3.2 percent of the property to allow the fee
owners to build a driveway in exchange for an equal-sized
easement on a previously unrestricted portion of the land. From a
practical and policy perspective, the agreement made sense-it
allowed the easement holder and fee owner to work out ongoing
issues through dialogue, with a net benefit to conservation values
(the removal of aluminum siding). Under the Illinois statute
granting owners within 500 feet standing, however, a neighbor
brought suit challenging the amendment. The neighbors' reason
for the suit was not stated-was it to protect conservation
generally and for the public benefit? Was the neighbors' view
particularly affected by the landscaping change? Was the driveway
placement inconvenient? Did the additional structure size interfere
with the enjoyment of their land? Was there a personal gripe
involved? Did this affect their property value? The various
opinions found that the driveway land swap and the expanded
structure were barred by the easement terms.1 64
E.

Director/TrusteeLiability

Directors (aka trustees) of NPOs may hesitate to amend or
release an easement out of a concern that this would violate their
fiduciary duty of obedience to the organization's mission and
expose them to personal liability.1 65 Statements such as that of
Senator Charles Grassley, then-Chair of the Senate Finance
Committee, that "modifying these easements is a huge no-no" can
intimidate nonprofit directors from approving alterations that are in
the public interest and encompassed by the organization's
mission.1 66

Directors insurance and lawyers' opinion letters may give
164 936 N.E.2d at 768-69, 772-73 (affirming the trial court's holding on
remand that the changes to the landscaping and driveway had to be reverted). In
contrast, courts-where there was no express third party standing legislationhave rejected neighbor standing in other cases. See, e.g., McEvoy v. Palumbo,
CV106002253S, 2011 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2939 (Nov. 15, 2011); Zagrans v.
Elek, No. 08CA009472, 2009 WL 1743203 (Ohio Ct. App. June 22, 2009).
165 See Alan M. Palmiter, Duty of Obedience: The ForgottenDuty, 55 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 457, 466-71 (2010/11).
166 Lisa Black & Courtney Flynn, Couple Sue Neighbor Over Use of
Conservation Land, CHI. TRIBUNE, Dec. 1, 2005, http://articles.chicagotribune.
com/2005-12-01/news/0512010243_1_easement-conservation-land-conservation
-agreement.
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some comfort. What is really needed, however, is for legislatures
and courts to clarify rules on modification and termination of
conservation easements so that directors can fulfill their obligation
to their NPOs' missions without fear.
Under any modification regime, however, directors should
still be accountable for modifications that do not serve the
organization's mission and thus breach the fiduciary duties of
loyalty, care, and obedience, as well as for actions placing the
NPO's 501(c)(3) tax status at risk. The specter of personal actions
against directors for breach of duty is an important tool in ensuring
that NPO modification decisions serve the organization's mission
and bring overall conservation benefits. Notably, this obligation
attaches to all NPOs and is not a function of charitable trust law.
F.

OrganizationalConsiderations

NPOs may face philosophical, practical, and market
oppositions to a policy favoring modification of conservation
easements. Additionally, there may be capacity issues.
1.

Mission

First, NPOs are legitimately concerned that the loosening of
conservation restrictions will violate the organization's mission
and over time may weaken the organization's conservation ethic.
They may also fear that if their organization has a significant
record of making amendments, people might hesitate to donate or
even sell conservation easements to it since the transferor may
want to be sure that the land will be protected forever. Moreover,
NPOs seek to avoid a potential public relations disaster if easement
alterations are viewed by the general public and regulators as
subverting the conservation mission. Nonprofits may also be
reluctant to amend easements out of a concern that this will create
complications for the donor under the Internal Revenue Code or
raise concerns about the NPO's own tax status. 167
These are substantial considerations, ones that might lead
many NPO boards to eschew a modification policy. Other boards,
however, might believe that their conservation mission can be best
served with a more flexible easement program. These boards might
pursue a modification agenda and in doing so should proactively
address concerns with potential donors, the broader community,
167

See supra note 129.
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and legal advisers in order to mitigate risks. Moreover, such NPOs
might take additional steps. They should adopt a formal policy that
consideration received to amend or transfer an easement must be
reinvested for conservation purposes and should be commensurate
with the value of the compromised easement rights. Easement
holders should carefully explain this policy both at time of
acquisition and time of amendment. The holder should also make
clear that amendments will only be undertaken if they serve the
organization's overarching conservation mission, by increasing the
preservation gains of properties held by the organization or
allowing for the purchase of other mission-enhancing property
rights.
2.

Capacity

Furthermore, some organizations lack the administrative
capacity to consider and address amendment requests, just as some
organizations lack the resources and staff to adequately steward
easements that they hold.1 68 If the easement holder lacks the
human and financial resources to effectively respond to negotiation
overtures from the fee owner, it will be difficult if not impossible
for the parties to reach an agreement. There have been some
attempts to address this issue, such as Internal Revenue Code
requirements that a donee organization must have the resources to
enforce the restriction and must be allowed access to inspect the
easement. This does not guarantee, however, that the organization
will operate effectively, especially over the long term.1 69
G.

Lack of Transparency

One of the greatest challenges to policy makers in addressing
conservation easements and their modification is that, with few
exceptions, there is no centralized list of conservation easements
70 While a title search on a given
within any given jurisdiction.o
property will reveal any claims against it, including conservation
easements, policy makers do not have an overall view of the
168 See Komgold, Contentious Issues, supra note 6, at 1062-63.
169 The IRS requires that an organization have adequate stewardship
resources in order for a deduction to be valid. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(c)(1).
But the financial position of an NPO can easily erode so that it becomes hard
pressed to adequately monitor easements. Best practices might include
requesting a fund from the donor for monitoring but the donor may not agree.
170 See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 6, at 1046-47.
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number, scope and pattern of easements across a region. The
advances of the NCED to compile a census of easements have
been noted above, but it must be noted again that this is only a
voluntary system.171 The disclosure of easement ownership and
amendments on the IRS Form 990 provides only partial
information and is not sufficient for policy makers to make
informed decisions.1 72
States might consider increasing transparency of conservation
easement holdings statewide by mandating special indices for
conservation easements, as currently required by a few
jurisdictions.1 73 To ensure that information is current, this
requirement should be extended to any modifications made to the
original easement instrument.
CONCLUSION

Conservation easements held by nonprofit organizations have
brought tremendous gains in land preservation over recent years by
maintaining the environmental and ecological features of millions
of acres of American land. While generally intended to be held in
perpetuity, courts, legislatures, practitioners, and commentators
have actively discussed whether and under what guidelines
modifications should be permitted.
Our research has developed a database that provides evidence
showing that modifications are already taking place, indicates that
most of the changes are conservation neutral or positive, and
appears to demonstrate that NPO holders need flexibility on some
issues related to easement ownership. Moreover, we see a range of
modification issues, and we might expect these to increase over
time with changes in the environment and human conditions. Thus,
a jurisdiction could seek to adopt a range of procedural and
substantive rules depending on the type of modification and the
particular policies that it invokes, rather than a unitary approach.
171 See supra Section l.A.
172 See supra Section III.
173 See, e.g., CAL. GOv'T CODE § 27255(a) (West 2015) (for easements
created after Jan. 1, 2002); ME. REV. STAT. § 479-C (requiring easement holders
to register annually with the state's Department of Agriculture, Conservation and
Forestry); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 49-0305(4) (McKinney 2015). Maine
requires an annual filing by holders of conservation easements to a designated
state department of the recording information of all conservation easements
retained by the holder. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 477-C (2015).
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We think that the best answers to the modification question will
emerge from a policy-based discussion informed by, among other
factors, empirical data about what NPOs are actually doing.
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